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INTRODUCTION 
Gareth Austin (LSE) 
This Working Paper reconsiders the proposition that depressions provide less-developed 
economies with opportunities for industrial development. The four chapters were 
presented during the Lent Term of 1998 as individual papers at the LSE seminar on the 
Comparative Economic History of Africa, Asia and Latin America. This introduction 
highlights some of the themes in the context of the discussions at the seminar. 1 
By definition, episodes of falling real income per head are setbacks, at least 
temporarily, for economic growth. Relatedly, it would be hard to dispute that, for 
example, the Great Depression of the early 19305 reduced the average 'welfare' of the 
Indian population on any economist's definition of the term. Yet these pessimistic 
macro and short-term observations are not sufficient to exclude the possibility that, 
amidst the general decline, there may be gains at fmn and sector level in resources, 
output and income; and/or institutional reforms, whether at local or national level: all 
of which could facilitate long-term growth and structural development in the economy 
as a whole . 
The familiar dependency proposition, which was urged most vigorously in the 
1960s-70s, is that depressions in international trade permit industrial development in 
' under-developed' economies by liberating domestic producers from the pre-empting 
competition of imports from more advanced economies.2 Subsequent work has provided 
further evidence that manufacturing output rose during the 1930s Depression, to take 
1 My personal thanks to STICERD (the Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and 
Related Disciplines) and the Department of Economic History, LSE, for their support for the seminar; to 
William Gervase Clarence-Smith for suggesting the theme; to all who participated in the discussions, 
which in a sense are partly reported in this introduction; and to Kaoru Sugihara for detailed comments on 
the draft. The mistakes are mine. 
2 A stark statement was Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America 
(Monthly Review Press: New York, 1967). 
the most striking example, in parts of Africa and mainland Asia as well as in Japan and 
Latin America. 3 On the other hand, revisionists have challenged the significance of the 
observation, notably by emphasising that industrial growth had already well begun 
during earlier years of expanding international trade, especially c.1900-1914. This was 
true, for example, of Brazil and India. The development of a modern textile industry 
in Sao Paulo was complementary to the agricultural export economy: not only in the 
sense that coffee earnings provided much of the early market but also in that much of 
the initial capital was provided by coffee barons reinvesting profits from their 
agricultural exports. Further finance came from importers .4 The equivalent industry in 
India managed to establish itself and grow without even the benefit of tariff protection, 
partly by the technique - also used in Brazil - of specialising in cloths coarser than those 
offered by the importers .5 
The chapters provide four new case-studies, of: the Argentine depression of 
1897 (Fernando Rocchi); intra-Asian trade and its links with East Asian industrialisation 
in the interwar period (Kaoru Sugihara); the success of - some of the - Arab 
entrepreneurs in expanding, diversifying and technologically modernising industry in 
what are now Indonesia and Malaysia in the 1930s (William Gervase Clarence-Smith); 
and the growth of indigenous small-scale industry in Ghana amidst the country's 
3 Christopher Baker, ' Debt and the Depression in Madras, 1929-1936' in A.G. Hopkins and Clive Dewey 
(eds), The Imperial Impact (Athlone Press: London, 1978), 233-42 and 370-1; lan Brown (ed.), The 
Economies of Africa and Asia in the Inter-war Depression (Routledge: London, 1989), introduction and 
chapters on Egypt (R. Owen), central and southern Africa (W.G. Clarence-Smith), China (R. Myers) and 
on Japanese indU5trial growth (K. Sugihara). On Latin America see Rosemary Thorp (ed.), Latin America 
in the 1930s: the role of the periphery in world crisis (Macmillan: London, 1984). 
4 Warren Dean, The Industrialization ofSao Paulo. 1880-1945 (University of Texas Press:Austin, 1969). 
See, further, Colin M. Lewis, ' IndU5try in Latin America Before 1930', in Leslie Bethell (ed.), Cambridge 
History of Latin America, IV, c.1870 to 1930 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1986). 
S For a recent overview of the emergence of the mechanised cotton textile indU5try in India see B.R. 
Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India 1860-1970 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1993), 
106-12. On quality compare Dean, Industrialization ofSao Paulo, 10-11. 
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otherwise general economic decline during the 19705 and early 1980s (Rajiv Ball). 
Individually and collectively they illustrate the directions in which current research is 
taking our understanding of the general issue. Among these I would emphasise four. 
1. ' Relatively autonomous' growth and endogenous depressions 
A central theme in the (non-dependency) economic historiography of Africa, Asia and 
Latin America over the last four decades has been the accumulation of evidence against 
the traditional Eurocentric assumption that the economic history of these continents 
since c.1500 has been essentially the story of the EuropeaniWestern impact. In the 
context of world depressions, it has been argued strongly that China largely escaped the 
1930s depression, and that even in those Asian and African economies much more 
integrated in the world economy than was China, 'and thus notably vulnerable to 
external contraction, the internal dynamics of economic change continued to exert their 
powerful influence' . 6 This insistence on relative autonomy from 'global' forces of 
Western origin is taken further in the essays presented here . 
Rocchi explicitly shifts the research focus from depressions which, for ' Third 
World' economies, were exogenous to depressions which were endogenous. The same 
applies, most writers would agree, to the recent Ghanaian case studied by Ball : the 
declining GDP was the result more of domestic policies than of external shocks.? This 
in turn raises the question, which readers may wish to consider when approaching both 
these chapters, of whether endogeneity alters the kinds of opportunities which 
depressions may offer to local entrepreneurs . 
Sugihara puts the 1930s depression in the context of the long-term growth of 
intra-Asian trade and of East Asian industrialisation: which he sees as decisively linked. 
• lan Brown, ' Introduction', to Brown (ed.), Economies of Africa and Asia in the Inter-war Depression, 
4. The China paper referred to is Ramon H. Myers, ' The World Depression and the Chinese Economy, 
1930-6', in the same volume, 253-78. 
7 See, for example, 10nathan H. Frimpong-Ansah, The Vampire State in Africa. The Political Economy 
of Decline in Ghana (James Currey: London, 1991); Douglas Rimmer, Staying Poor. Ghana's Political 
Economy, 1950-1990 (pergamon Press: Oxford, 1992). 
3 
This chapter provides a statement in English of an extremely important thesis which 
Sugihara and colleagues have been developing, and which has previously been 
presented mainly in Japanese. His essay puts forward a key statistical fmding, that 
intra-Asian trade grew much faster than world trade in the interwar period (as was also 
true of 1880-1913). He goes on to relate this to East Asia's industrialisation - depicting 
Korea, Taiwan and, more slowly, China following Japan's flightpath - and to explore 
the implications for industrial growth elsewhere in the continent. 
Specifically on depressions, while Sugihara's paper implicitly accepts that 
reduced foreign competition may have helped industrial entrepreneurship within South 
and Southeast Asia, his analysis points to global depression as a constraint on East 
Asian industrial exports to the European colonies of Asia. He argues that Southeast and 
South Asia's primary product exports to the West provided the import-purchasing 
power that made it possible for these areas to buy large and generally increasing 
amounts of East Asian manufactures . 
Thus intra-Asian trade helps explain the phenomenon noted above, that by 1914 
mechanised textile production had emerged in India despite the absence of infant 
industry protection. In this context, the ' final demand linkage' complicates the 
traditional bilateral (European! Asian, in this context) understanding of international 
trade and Third World (under-)development. The bilateral view, he shows, was losing 
relevance in this period because Asian consumers increasingly preferred to purchase 
their industrial goods from East Asia rather than from Europe: albeit, this trend was 
constrained for the moment by the continued influence of European colonialism in 
South and Southeast Asia. 
2. Supply-side opportunities 
From Clarence-Srnith's and Rocchi's papers I think we can legitimately derive a 
suggestion that, in returning to the analysis of evidence of industrial expansion during 
depressions, we explore a different set of possible sources of such growth. These 
papers shift the emphasis from the demand-side opportunity of freedom from foreign 
4 
competition (though that remains an essential part of the story for Clarence-Smith, as 
for Ball) to the supply-side opportunities provided by cheaper factors of production 
(Clarence-Smith) and the chance (or need) to rationalise the structure of ownership. 
On the latter point, Rocchi argued that depression facilitated the concentration 
of Argentine suppliers of industrial goods, both importers and manufacturers (who were 
often the same firms), in Buenos Aires . The defeat of provincial competitors by 
metropolitan firms contributed to the formation of a national market, in the sense that 
consumers came to be served by the same (Argentine) firms throughout the national 
territory . A key question is whether this actually contributed to national economic 
growth and· development. Rocchi gives us the example of the tanning industry as one 
in which the process of concentration allowed individual firms to achieve economies 
of scale, fostering mechanisation. 
3. Determinants of the capacity to seize the opportunities of depression: including 
the role of ethnic diasporas 
If depressions provide opportunities, what variables determine the nature of the 
response? One link with revisionist critiques of the structuralist-dependency argument 
would be the contention that the ability to exploit breaks from foreign competition is 
a function of the extent to which supply-side assets, of various kinds, have been built 
up during the preceding period of prosperity . 
The growth of small-scale industry in Ghana has been interpreted precisely in 
terms of import replacement, but Ball's evidence suggests that while the temporary 
absence of foreign competition provided an opportunity, what made it possible for 
Ghanaian entrepreneurs to seize it was a relatively long prior process of accumulation 
of skills and capital. While such opportunities may not have been rare in tropical Africa 
in that period, he implies, the capacity to take advantage of it was. 
Institutional assets may be crucial too. It is well established that ethnic diasporas 
have often provided an institutional frame facilitating commerce, especially long-
distance trade. Indeed, this is, or should be, one of the building blocks of the emerging 
5 
literature on ' global history'. 8 Clarence-Smith' s chapter provides an example of an 
ethnic trading network pioneering modern industrial growth in part of the ' Third 
World', a case which (as he emphasised in the seminar discussions) was far from 
unique. In the context of his argument about depressions, this seems to imply that the 
extent to which opportunities arising from them are taken is to a large extent a function 
of the entrepreneurial efficiency of the ethnic networks operating in the economy 
concerned. 
There was interesting but inconclusive discussion in the seminar about how to 
explain the very varied economic destinies of different ethnic networks, and ' of 
members of the same network, in the same conjuncture. In Clarence~Smith's example, 
the Hadhrami community lies in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, why did the non-
Sayyids succeed much more than the Sayyids? The problem of what makes determines 
the economic efficiency of an ethnic network in the context of depression, and of how 
far membership accounts for members' fortunes , clearly requires further research. A 
further research question, suggested by Sugihara,9 is how ethnic diasporas compared 
to the state, in the context of the 1930s depression, as institutions for solving problems 
of cooperation: providing infonnation, insurance and security of property . 
4. The politics of industry in the context of depression 
All the chapters relate business trends to government behaviour and/or with social and 
political conflict: in diverse ways. Rocchi argues that a major cause of the process of 
concentration· of ownership in turn-of-the-century Argentina was the contemporary 
political imperative to further the integration of the market as a means of consolidating 
national identity. A political element in the motivation of business behaviour was also 
mentioned (explicitly in the discussion, less directly in the paper) by Clarence-Smith 
a The pioneer work is Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge Universiry 
Press: Cambrige, 1984). 
9 Personal communication. 
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on the Hadhramis in the Malay world: one reason for the rise of non-Sayyid Hadhrami 
entrepreneurs in the 1930s, he suggests, may have the desire to challenge what they saw 
as the social pretensions of the Sayyid group. Sugihara links his economic story to 
Japanese imperialism in the 1930s, in several ways . Ball notes that the success of small-
scale industry during the Ghanaian economic decline owed something to government 
investment in human capital formation, so qualifying the widely accepted liberal view 
that government policies in post-colonial Ghana had been disastrous until the adoption 
of Structural Adjustment in 1983. An appropriate question for further reflection is how 
it might be possible to incorporate politics systematically into the economic history of 
depression at a comparative and general Third World level. 
7 
1. ARGENTINE INDUSTRY AND THE FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL 
MARKET,1870-1910 
Fernando Rocchi (Universities of Buenos Aires, Di TeUa and LSE) 
This paper delv~s into the fonnation of a national market for manufactured goods in 
Argentina during the period of export boom at the turn of the nineteenth century. 1 In 
those years, most Latin American countries integrated into the world market, fashioned 
export-oriented economies and experienced the recurrent depressions of capitalism. Not 
surprisingly; export-related activities have absorbed the attention of historians . 
Domestic markets grew in parallel to export growth (and to a large extent as its 
consequence), and at a similar pace. Nevertheless, their importance has been 
disregarded until recently, when new figures have showed that they had a remarkable 
impact upon the economy as a whole: in Argentina, for instance, economic activities 
oriented to the domestic market comprised well above half of GDP.2 Roberto Cortes 
Conde's study of the fonnation of factor markets - for labour and land - in Argentina, 
then, is isolated research amidst an overwhelming deficiency: indeed, no study of the 
domestic goods market has yet been undertaken.3 A similar situation exists in relation 
to depressions, which are assumed to have been the consequences of international 
disturbances . Depressions with domestic causes have not been noticed - still less 
researched - despite their possible importance for the economic perfonnance. Among 
them, the one that was sparked in 1897 has been especially neglected . 
I The definition of 'national markef is taken from Emilio Sereni's Gramscian perspective in his 
Capitalismo e mercato nazionale (Editori Riuniti: Roma, 1974). 
2 Roberto Cortes Conde, 'Estimaciones del Producto Bruto Interno de Argentina 1875-1935' Universidad 
de San Andres (mimeograph, 1994), 17-18. For the importance of studies of national market construction 
in Latin American see Stephen Topik, 'The State's Contribution to the Development of Brazil's Internal 
Economy, 1850-1930', Hispanic American Historical Review 65, 2 (1985), 203-28; and Stephen Haber, 
'Assessing the Obstacles to Industrialisation: The Mexican Economy, 1830-1940', Journal of Latin 
American Studies 24 (February 1992), 1-32. 
) Roberto Cortes Conde, El progreso argentino (Sudamericana: Buenos Aires, 1979). 
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In parallel with the export boom, Argentina achieved the formation of its first 
centralised state since independence and experienced the creation of a national identity 
that became an obsession for a country with a past of bloody civil wars and for a 
society composed overwhelmingly of immigrants. The integration of different regions 
into a domestic, and national, market was part of the process . One of the features of 
this market was ~e high concentration of the rising industrial activity in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina's capital and main city, in all branches but sugar and wine. The primacy of 
Buenos Aires has prompted scholarly research and essays. Yet the role played by 
industry in this primacy has been neglected, with the exception of Michael Johns's 
research. Why did the country not develop more regional manufacturing centres in 
sectors beyond the above-mentioned agroindustries? Why did secondary cities not 
become Argentine versions of the Mexican Monterrey? By studying Rosario, a major 
grain port and the second largest city, Johns has stated that the advantage of controlling 
production and commercial circuits from the national capital hindered the industrial 
development of Argentina's second city . 4 
Many reasons are at issue in explaining this primacy. The building of a railway 
network has been assumed to be the main one since it established the basis for market 
forces to mobilise further with freedom and success. Nonetheless, railway construction, 
as Colin Lewis has shown, was just one (albeit crucial) driving force for the booming 
economy. In addition, he has challenged the long-standing idea that train tariffs 
discriminated in favour of Buenos Aires. So it is necessary to look elsewhere for causes 
of the concentration of activities in this city. S Cheaper train transportation was a 
necessary though not sufficient condition for the shape that the domestic market for 
products acquired. The formation of this market, indeed, was a long and complex 
4 Michael Johns, ·The Urbanisation of a Secondary City: The Case ofRosario, Argentina, 1870-1920', 
Journal of Latin American Studies 23, 3 (1991), 489-513. For the traditional perspective on Buenos Aires 
primacy see James Scobie, Buenos Aires: Plaza to Suburb. 1870-1910 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
1974). 
S Colin Lewis, British Railways in Argentina 1857-1914: A Case Study of Foreign Investment (Athlone: 
London, 1983), 207-20. 
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process, a collective effort in which the state and the private sector (including the 
railways) played a conscious and active role, rather than allowing market forces to 
operate on their own. 
In this paper I focus on the production and commercialisation of manufactured 
goods to explore further reasons for the concentration of industry in Buenos Aires, 
considering not <.>nly how potential alternative sites were deterred but also hbw existing 
ones were crushed. I pay special attention to industrial firms' strategies to control a 
market embracing the entire country. These strategies, either within or outside the rules 
of the market, took their fmal shape after the above-mentioned depression of 1897, 
which hit industry hard and meant the geographical broadening of firrils ' sales . In so 
doing, they took a large part in the creation of a national market and in the peculiar 
shape that Argentine nationality achieved in those years . 
1. From Buenos Aires to the conquest of the country 
Following independence from Spain in 1816, the area that later turned out to be 
Argentina was divided into fourteen provinces . Though part of a loose confederation, 
each province had its own laws, armies and customs houses. After unification in 1862, 
the country's rulers aimed to end barriers to internal trade. This was a difficult 
undertaking since provinces used taxes on this commerce as one of their main sources 
of revenue . Between 1878 and 1881 the national government issued laws to unify the 
system of weights and measures and the national currency . 6 Obstacles to inter-
provincial trade were, however, still rife. Provincial customs houses had been outlawed 
by the 1853 constitution, but enforcement was achieved against serious resistance. 
Various attempts to impose taxes on internal commerce prompted the intervention of 
the National Supreme Court, an institution that only won the dispute when the central 
state achieved enough capacity and power over the provinces . By the 1900s, most of 
6 Vicente Balbin, Sistema de pesas y medidas de la Republica Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1881); Juan 
A1varez, Temas de historia economica argentina (Buenos Aires, 1929), 155-7. 
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these hindrances had disappeared.' In addition, by the l890s railways linked the main 
cities. With cheap transportation and the end of legal barriers, the necessary conditions 
for the integration of the domestic market for manufactured goods were set up. Its final 
shape, with Buenos Aires firms controlling Argentine production, related to other 
reasons, mainly the comparative advantages of the capital city in attracting factory 
location and its ~ompan.ies' monopolistic strategies to seize the market. 
Buenos Aires and its surrounding region had the largest demand in the country, 
which provided an incentive for opening factories (in 1895 the city and the province of 
Buenos Aires comprised 40 per cent of the country's population while in 1914 its 
participation had increased to 46 per cent) . Industrial concentration, whether 
considering labour or capital, highly surpassed those percentages, especially in those 
branches of manufacturing where large factories rather than handicraft output prevailed 
(see Table 1). 
The area's population was richer than the Argentine average, which would 
partially explain the difference between population figures and industrial capacity. In 
addition, the large numbers of people provided a labour supply. Other rich (and 
populated) parts of the country, however, did not have the same destiny. The most 
resounding case was the above-mentioned city of Rosario. In 1919, Juan Alvarez, a 
famous economic essayist and Rosario native, stated with pain the lack of substantial 
industry in his city despite its comparative advantages in labour supply and levels of 
consumption. He complained about a political conspiracy against his town.8 Rather than 
a conspiracy, the nature of Argentine industry and industrialists was involved. A large 
portion of raw material was imported; moreover, industrialists imported and traded 
finished goods in the very same branch they operated so that sales of imports and 
manufactured goods became mutually reinforcing. Since Buenos Aires had the vast 
7 Yet, by the 191 Os complaints were made about provincial trade barriers. See Liga de Defensa Comercial, 
Informe leido por el Presidenle Sr. Anlonio Lean Lanusse en la Asamblea General Ordinaria del 29 de 
Diciembre de 1914 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta Enrique L. Frigerio, 1914), 23 and 70. 
I Juan Alvarez, Buenos Aires (Imprenta de la Facultad: Buenos Aires, 1919). 
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majority of import activity , establishing their factories in the capital enabled these 
industrialists (and merchants) to develop their dual enterprises in the very same place . 
In addition, being both industrialists and importers , they could not promote a full free-
trade nor protectionist policy but rather argued about tariffs case by case . As import 
tariffs were voted year by year, they had to lobby constantly; to be physically close to 
the Congress and the executive power made this lobby more effective. 9 
After settling down in nearby markets, Buenos Aires firms made efforts to 
expand their sales in more distant areas. In the early 1880s, it was not the general rule 
for them to trade beyond the city outskirts. In the 191Os, however, sales in the inner 
provinces became widespread for most of those companies .IO Before' the end of the 
nineteenth century, manufactured goods produced in Buenos Aires were already well 
established in the Pampas (the region surrounding the city and where most of export 
crops grew). This demand exploded when agriculture gained strength in a traditional 
cattle-ranching country . The settlement of farmers and sharecroppers, indeed, provided 
a potential market for consumer goods. That was the case of foreign colonists dedicated 
to cereal production in some Littoral provinces: mainly Santa Fe, Entre Rios, and the 
Southeast of Cordoba. This market, called las colonias (the colonies), was an early 
target for the industrial firms of Buenos Aires since colonists demanded a wide variety 
of articles these companies sought to provide . 11 In addition, colonists demanded 
9 Femando Rocchi, 'La armonia de los opuestos: Industria, importaciones y la construcci6n urbana de 
Buenos Aires en el periodo 1880-1920', Entrepasados 4, 7 (1994). 
10 For the 1880s see Alejandro Galarce, Bosquejos de Buenos Aires, capital de la nacion argentina 
(Buenos Aires, 1886), vol 1,734, 742. In the 19105, ready-to-wear houses started promoting their articles 
in two columns, A nuestra clientela de la capitallA nuestra clientela del interior (To our customers of the 
capita1ffo our customers of the interior), while cigarette, beer, and other item producers in Buenos Aires 
expanded advertising and trade all over the country. La Naci6n, 19 October 1910, p. 5; La Nacion. Edicion 
conmemorativa de la revolucion del2S de mayo de 1910, p. 61; La Nacion. Edicion aniversario de la 
independencia, 1916, p. 153; La Republica Argentinapintoresca, comercial e industrial, 1906, p. 45. 
11 Ezequiel Gallo, La pampa gringa (Sudamericana: Buenos Aires, 1983). 
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qualities similar to those consumed in Buenos Aires so that fIrms did not need to make 
changes in production or packaging to supply themY 
The rest of Cordoba province and the Northwest, however, proved to be much 
more difficult a market. Being the area of oldest Spanish settlement, the lack of a staple 
to export turned it into the most economically backward area by the turn of the 
nineteenth century. This region's poverty limited its purchases to the worse qualities 
or to products already out of fashion in Buenos Aires . 13 Notwithstanding its limits, it 
had enough consumers to attract the attention of producers both in Buenos Aires and 
abroad . 14 
2. Depression and the reshaping of capitalism 
The supply side explains part of the successful conquest of this market by Buenos Aires 
industrial firms . Argentine industry was facing major transformations in the 1900s and 
leaning towards heavy concentration of capital. To a large extent, these changes were 
the response to a depression that hit the country in the late 1890s. Industry had grown 
at high speed after the 1890 depression, which was followed by high tariffs and 
devaluation of local currency. Continuing growth came to an end in 1897, when 
industrial production dropped for the fust time since 1881 (see Table 2) . As I said 
before, both the existence and depth of the 1897 depression have been ignored by a 
historiography focussed on the export-oriented economy. Contemporaries, however, 
became keenly aware of its occurrence and ill effects and produced a variety of sources 
12 Exposicion Nacional de 1898, XI, 9 December 1897, p. 83. 
J3 Censo Municipal de J 887, vo!' Il, 335·6. For instance, while the highest quality doble beer, which was 
produced by large !inns in the capital, displaced the coarse sencilla in the Pampas, the Northwest still 
consumed the latter. See Diaria de Sesianes de la Camara de Dipu/ados (hereafter cited as DSCD), 23 
October 1894, 306. 
J4 10 the case of foreign firms, trade in the interior was important enough to become some import 
houses' main target and to worry the British consul who made a trip to the provinces in 1907 to 
study his country's commercial activity. See Finanzas. comercio e industria en la Republica 
Argentina, I (I January 1899), 80; U.K. Public Record Office, Foreign Office (hereafter cited 
as FO), 368/86, Commercial 59, Buenos Aires, July 181907, Baird, p. 1. 
13 
for its study. Tbe causes of the 1897 recession mainly lay in the excessive growth of 
domestic output - especially in industry and commerce - during the 1890s. The crisis 
was sparked by a political event: the threat of war between Argentina and Chile over 
territorial disputes . When the war menace looked real, the public converted its deposits 
from local pesos to hard currency and withdrew many of them, provoking a banking 
contraction. Singe banks were the initiators of the credit chain (which continued with 
merchants granting loans to their customers), the multiplying effects on the circuit were 
devastating. IS 
Excess capacity was a major structural reason to explain the depth of the 
depression in industry, well beyond what production figures show: Producers of 
candles, spirits , household wares, glass, bats, paper, shoes, pins, undersbirts , 
chocolate, glass, textiles and bags were running at 50 or 60 per cent of capacity . 16 
Savage battles between firms followed overproduction; prices plummeted, profits 
shrank and the very existence of many firms was in jeopardy. 17 Demand, indeed, was 
smaller than industrialists had predicted. T. Wortbington, a commissioner sent by the 
British Crown to review the prospects for trade, noticed industrial turbulence and 
predicted, ' weaker individual factories may have to go'. His prediction was accurate. IS 
Increasing exports joined a peace agreement with Chile to foster an atmosphere 
of rapid and continuing growth in the domestic economy in the 1900s. In order to cope 
IS Femando Rocchi, 'Building a Nation, Building a Market: Industrial Growth and the Domestic Economy 
in Turn-of-the-Century Argentina', (ph.D. thesis: University of California, Santa Barbara, 1997). 
16 Finanzas, I (I )anuary 1899), pp. 139, 143; 2 (January 1900), p. 126; Dr. Moome, Los industrias 
fabriles en Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires: Librairie Franyaise de Joseph Escary, 1893), vol.l, pp. 46, 50, 
72-85; El Pais 21 June 1900, p. 2; Boletfn de la Union Industrial Argentina (hereafter cited as BUJA), 15 
February 1894, p. 2; Bureau of the American Republics, Handbook of the Argentine Republic Bulletin no 
67 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1892), 97-8 and 100. 
11 See Acta no 13, 23 August 1894 in Tarifas de Aduana. Estudios y antecedentes para su discusion 
legislativa por la Comision Revisora nombrada por el Pader Ej ecutivo (Cia Sudarnericana de BilIetes de 
Banco: Buenos Aires, 1894) CX!; El Pais, 22 January 1900, p. 5. 
11 T. Worthington, The Special Commissioner Appointed by the Board of Trade to Inquire into and Report 
upon the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in certain South American Countries. Third Report. 
The Argentine Republic (Eyre and Spottiswoode: London, 1898) 4. 
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with the new situation of increasing demand (but under the ghost of overproduction), 
industrial firms used some new strategies and gave more strength to old ones: the 
outcome was a reshaped supply. 
One response to new market challenges was a transformation in the size of 
fIrms, which was raised to unprecedented levels, fostering mechanisation and 
economies of scale in Buenos Aires firms and helping them to conquer the national 
market. The tanning industry offers an example. The northwestern provinces of 
Tucuman, Sa Ita and Jujuy had had a flourishing industry of shoe soles that prompted 
a dynamic regional trade. By the 1890s, this activity languished since Buenos Aires 
factories undertook the entire process of tanning cattle products instead of just fInishing 
soles bought in the North.19 The concentration of capital deepened Buenos Aires's 
dominance: between 1895 and 1914, the three northern provinces' share in total energy 
consumption in Argentine tanneries fell from 15 to 9 per cent. While Buenos Aires 
tanneries mechanised and adopted the latest chemical advances made in the world at the 
time, the Northern workshops continued working ' with primitive proceedings, the same 
inherited from the colonial times' .20 
3. The victory of big business 
Together with increasing mill size, a process of merging fIrms occurred in beer, 
cigarette, hat, biscuit, textile, metallurgical, and paper production. Thus the 
concentration of capital was deepened further, though the changes went beyond this and 
meant the victory of big business, a different phenomenon. Indeed, a small market can 
be occupied by a small number of producers as was, to some extent, the case of 
Argentina until the 189Os. Big business, however, is a further phenomenon implying 
monopolistic or oligopolistic control of the market regardless of its size. Between 1900 
19 BUJA , 20 October 1899, 30. 
20 Hlix de Ugarteche, Las industrias del cuero en la Republica Argentina (Talleres Graficos de Roberto 
Canals: Buenos Aires, 1927) 32; Segundo Censo Nacionall895, 271·301; Tercer Censo Nacionall914, 
120-376. 
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and 1913, total GDP and GDP per head almost tripled and doubled, respectively (see 
Table 2). To cope with highly competitive markets, concentration was not enough: 
other tactics were employed. The creation of trusts, pools or gentleman 's agreements 
for price agreements occurred in almost every branch of industry including matches, 
hats, spirits, bags, pins, paper, textiles, and even ice. It transformed market rules .21 
Concentration ap.d trusts, indeed, had the dual function of increasing aDd reducing 
competition. 22 
Buenos Aires fIrms applied monopolistic strategies to gain control of the entire 
Argentine market. The case of the biscuit industry, which had some development in the 
inner provinces and offered many opportunities for entry because relatively little 
investment was required , is a good example. By the end of the nineteenth century the 
market for biscuits was divided into two regions supplied by different fIrms : the 
Pampas and zones of influence (including the East and the West) and the Cordoba-
Northwestern area. The former was served by the powerful Buenos Aires companies 
Bagley and La Union and by two middle-size establishments in secondary cities in the 
Pampas. The latter was only partially supplied by these fIrms while a group of local 
companies - mainly the Fabrica de Galletitas of Cordoba and La Tucumana of TucUlIl3n 
- accounted for a significant part of the regional production. 
The four frrms in the Pampas market competed fIercely, forcing them to reduce 
prices to remain competitive. In order to end price wars, in 1902 they created a pool 
called Fabricantes Unidos (UnifIed Manufacturers) that negotiated prices and 
established output quotaS .23 After the agreement, the pool took as a task the conquest 
of the national market, which meant the seizure of Cordoba and the Northwest. 
Economies of scale and access to railway transportation were a major help, though not 
21 DSCD, 22 October 1894, 283; and T. Worthington, The Argentine Republic, 36. 
22 Naomi Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-1904 (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1985),30, 46,86, 116, 154-5. 
23 Bagley S.A. Arcbives, Board of Directors (hereafter cited as BD), 7, 14, and 28 February 1902, 6 May 
1904. 
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enough to accomplish that goal since local factories showed a remarkable ability to 
resist. The main Cordoba firm had opened in 1888 and soon faced competition from 
Buenos Aires. By 1896, the construction of a railway line to Salta and Jujuy allowed 
the arrival of goods from the capital city at cheap prices and reduced its sales in the 
northwestern market. The firm, however, continued in business through reduction of 
profit margins, .plus receipt of subsidies and tax exemptions from the· provincial 
government. 24 Since the Cordoba company showed a surprising resilience, the 
consortium of the Pampas tried a new strategy and agreed to create 'a general fund to 
subsidise the small factories provided that they stop working' in the cities of Cordoba 
and Tucuman.2S In 1903, the pool made an offer that the Cordoba firm accepted: to pay 
an annual subsidy in cash that surpassed its profits, in exchange for turning off the 
ovens.26 
The end of production at the main regional fmn did not mean that the market fell 
like a ripe fruit into the hands of the consortium. Middle-sized establisnments proved 
to be extremely resistant. They used a variety of strategies such as lowering margins 
and over-exploiting the family workforce that most of them used. Moreover, the 
success of local firms lay partly in their adaptive commercial strategies, responding to 
the demand patterns of a market poorer than that of the Pampas. Indeed, they offered 
the type of products and packaging that their market required. According to an 
assessment by Bagley company, ' the petty biscuit factories in Cordoba and Tucuman 
hurt our sales in those areas [because they] sell their products of inferior quality at very 
low prices,.27 In addition, these firms sold biscuits in 17- to 18-kilo bundles instead of 
the 22 kilo ones that the Fabricantes Unidos traded in the richer Pampas and attempted 
2. BD, 14 March 1902; Hilda Iparaguirre, "Crecimiento industrial y formacion de la burguesia en una 
subregion argentina: Cordoba a finales del siglo XIX y principios del XX' in Enrique Florescano (ed.), 
Origenes y desarrollo de la burguesia en America Latina (Ed. Nueva Imagen: Mexico, 1985) 585-607. 
25 BD, 28 February 1902, 14 March 1902, and 2 October 1902. 
26 Ibid., 2 January 1903, 3 April 1903, 1 May 1903, and 5 February 1904. 
21 BD 23 August 1912 and 29 May 1909. 
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to impose everywhere. As the pool's main firm remarked, ' [t]his weight difference is 
in great demand in the interior so that [Bagley's manager] thought we should defend 
ourselves using the same methods' . To cope with lower incomes and different 
purchasing habits from the consumers they were used to supplying, the consortium 
designed a new merchandise line and created a coarse brand, both specific for the area 
they attempted to penetrate. 28 
After eliminating C6rdoba' s main factory, the chief source of competition came 
from Tucuman's largest producer, which was selling its biscuits at lower prices than 
Fabricantes Unidos. The suspicion was that Mr. Cremades, the owner of La Tucumana 
and of a smaller factory in C6rdoba, had launched a dumping strategy ill the provinces 
of Tucuman, Salta, Jujuy and Santiago del Estero in order to undermine the influence 
of the pool firms.29 Soon, negotiations started. First, Cremades 'insinuated to one of 
our [Bagley's] salesmen that he was eager to sell the machinery of his factories in 
Tucuman and C6rdoba for $40,000' but the pool considered this excessive and ' having 
no interest in the acquisition of the installations decided not to consider this offer'. 30 
Second, he offered to limit production to almost a fourth of the pool's sales, and to give 
the consortium control of his firm' s management. Finally, an agreement was reached 
in 1910 through the payment of a subsidy in exchange for the closing of La Tucumana 
and the restriction of his C6rdoba branch to producing only the coarsest products. As 
a result of the pact, the pool increased the price of its biscuits in Tucuman. 31 
Despite the deal, coexistence between Cremades and Fabricantes Unidos was not 
easy . The former was accused by the latter of producing biscuits not contemplated in 
the agreement and new negotiations began in 1911. These resulted in the sale of most 
21 Bagley even used new brand names - Libertad and Provincial- since they feared that using the old 
names would discredit them in the Pampas market. Ibid., 29 May 1909 and 30 March 1911. 
29 Ibid., 29 September 1909. 
30 Ibid., 13 November 1909. 
31 Ibid., 23 July 1910,28 September 1910 and 23 November 1910. 
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of the equipment used in Cremades factories in Tucuman and Cordoba, limiting 
production to only very coarse goods destined to be sold in Cordoba and the very poor 
provinces of La Rioja and Catamarca.32 Yet, Cremades and his extremely reduced 
installations continued to compete in Cordoba thanks to a provincial tax on 'imported' 
goods . In 1912 Bagley 's directors, ' persuaded of the advantage that exists in 
eliminating this competition [decided] that it is necessary to bring such an unSatisfactory 
situation to a conclusion, and to liquidate this factory by buying it, because in this way 
all the Northern region would be free' Y The consolidation of a market controlled by 
the pool equalised profit rates all over the country, rates previously distorted by 
promotion policies . Thereafter, different geographical areas started to exhibit similar 
profits (see Table 3) .34 
Bagley, which employed 18 per cent of the national workforce in the biscuit 
industry in 1895, reached 39 per cent by 1914, a level probably higher in output due 
to its technological leadership. In the meantime, the participation of Cordoba province 
firms had fallen from 5.5 to less than one per cent.35 The victory in this long-lasting 
battle was not a small one for the pool's main firm: by the 1920s between fifteen and 
twenty per cent of its sales were made in the Northwest and another five per cent in 
Cordoba. 36 
32 ibid., 28 April 1911, 28 June 1911, 13 February 1912. 
33 ibid., 23 August 1912, 29 November 1912, I and 11 August 1913. 
34 For a time, preferential prices still applied in the Costa Sud (patagonian Coast), explained by the 
dependence of this region on the Chilean market. Yet by the late 1910s, the situation started to change even 
there. ibid., 5 and 20 September 1915, and Libro de Precios (price Book) 1911-17. 
3S Segundo Censo Nacional, 1895, vo!. ill, p. 270 and Tercer Censo Nacionall914, vo!. vn, p. 395. The 
buy-out strategy was only employed to conquer a market that could not be gained otherwise. An offer to 
close down for money by a biscuit firm from GualeguaychU, Entre Rios, where the pool was well 
established, was rejected by the pool, which stressed salesmen's aggression. BD 10 May 1908, 18 
December 1909,31 August 1910. 
36 Bagley, Libro de Inventarios (Inventory Book). The extreme sensitivity of this market to consumers' 
income became apparent with the 1930 depression, when sales in the region dropped two-thirds while in 
the Pampas they only fell to half. Bagley, Libro de Cuentas Corrientes, Saldos Deudores (Current 
Accounts Book). 
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Meanwhile changes occurred in the pool itself which produced a qualitative 
change in biscuit supply. In 1905 the two main firms of Fabricantes Unidos, Bagley and 
La Union, merged and continued under the name of the former. This altered the 
internal structure of the consortium, which now was dominated by one company. 37 
Then, the middle-size firm La Julia, understanding that its power was going to become 
insubstantial in a pool so largely controlled by a sole company, offered to close its 
factory for a large sum of money . Bagley, however, saw the offer as unacceptable, not 
to mention useless.38 By then, it felt strong enough to fight with open-market tools: 
when another middle-size fum, Maneffa, entered the market and began producing a 
cheap and good quality biscuit, Bagley chose to engage in a price war. Thanks to new 
investments, reduction in salaries and advertising resources , it succeeded in producing 
a similar item at a cheaper cost: it could sell at $11.50 a biscuit bundle of the same kind 
that Maneffa offered at $15. 39 
With control of the national market, the industrial firms of Buenos Aires could 
enlarge their circle of consumers. Though the interior was important for these 
companies' sales, its significance went beyond making profits. Every corner of the 
country was worth supplying with Argentine merchandise, regardless of its demand. 
Even markets left aside by importers were meaningful to Buenos Aires firms . The 
Province of Catamarca, to which the British merchants did not bother to send travellers 
as 'it seems that it has not been worthwhile' , was important enough to the industrial 
establishments of the capital city for them to launch a price war there. 40 
37 BD 19 April 1906, 1 and 30 October and 30 November 1907, 24 October and 17 November 1908. 
3. BD 7 February 1905. 
39 BD 28 September 1910, 19 October 1910, and 23 October 1911. 
40 FO 6/469, Commercial 18, Buenos Aires, 6 September 1901 , Barrington, pp. 128-9. 
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Conclusion 
By the 191Os, most of Argentina was within a national market for manufactured goods 
controlled by Buenos Aires industrial finns, who were the main suppliers of articles 
produced domestically . Regional differences were still at stake and some peripheral 
areas continued. to be linked into the economies of neighbouring countries, but 
integration had become the rule. In terms of industrial output, the interior lost and 
Buenos Aires was victorious. The state played a crucial role by establishing the basis 
for the end of legal barriers to trade. This settlement, however, could have promoted 
industry everywhere. Consumers, raw material, labour and a peculiar type of 
industrialist directed location towards Buenos Aires. Economies of scale and cheap 
transportation partly prompted the control of the national market by the capital city's 
firms . Monopolistic strategies enabled them to seize the most resilient markets. In the 
shaping of these strategies, the 1897 depression played a crucial role. 
The effort to reach the borders with their products went beyond profit-seeking 
and transformed a merely domestic into a national market. War prices in remote places 
were also the result of an ideological driving force. An Argentine firm had to sell its 
products all over the country, no matter the cost. This is not surprising considering the 
attempt in the period to build an Argentine nation: an effort in which education, the 
military draft and merchandise joined forces . 
The formation of a national market was only partly the result of free market 
forces. In parallel with the reshaping of capitalism and the victory of big business, the 
efforts to create an Argentine nation lent towards fanaticism . In 1908 the Ministry of 
Education adopted a Catecismo C{vico (Civic Catechism) which every teacher and 
student at elementary schools had to learn by heart: a list of questions followed by 
answers stressing Argentina as the most generous, heroic, and endowed nation on earth. 
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Circulation of goods means circulation of symbols and culture;41 a sense of sharing 
arose between a consumers in Catamarca and those in Buenos Aires when drinking, 
eating and wearing clothes produced in the same firm, located in the capital city, which 
increasingly concentrated Argentines' attention. 
41 Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood, The World of Goods (Basic Books: New York, 1979); Chandra 
Mujerki, From Graven Images: Patterns of Modern Materialism (Columbia University Press: New York, 
1983). 
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TABLE 1. BUENOS AIRES' SHARE OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITAL AND 
LABOUR, 1914 
'Buenos Aires': city and province. Share as percentage of national total. 
Capital Labour 
Cooking oil 63.1 70.9 
Biscuits 93.2 75.4 
A1pargatas 75.3 74.4 
Beer 77.9 77.2 
Tobacco 95.0 70.8 
Shirts 93.9 95.3 
Textiles 97.6 75.2 
Shoes 86.6 86.2 
Hats 98.1 96.3 
Bags 92.7 71.3 
Furniture 74.5 77.2 
Foundries 91.5 48.8 
Tin-plate 90.9 95.7 
Soap-candles 81.2 70.9 
Chemical 90.1 80.9 
Glass 97.1 97.1 
Matches 89.6 80.6 
Paper 96.4 94.4 
Total 57.0 60.5 
Source: My own calculations based on Tercer Censo Nacional, vo\. VlI, pp. 115-26, 186-92, 
313-26, 395-403 . 
TABLE 2. ECONOMIC INDICATORS. ARGENTINA 1890-1910 (1900=100) 
GDP - GDP per capita Industrial Product 
1890 64.70 88.25 49.98 
1895 99.02 115.32 74.70 
1896 109.51 123.93 87.35 
1897 88.86 96.69 76.98 
1898 96.35 101.86 78.63 
1900 100 100 100 
1905 182.85 159.26 221.59 
1910 232.93 162.95 291.04 
1913 281.61 173.41 364.65 
Source: Cortes Conde, EstlmaclOnes del Producto Bruto Intemo', 17-20. 
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TABLE 3. BISCUITS LmERTAD AND PROVINCIAL (in $ m/n) 
Transport cost Price I Profi t I Price 2 Profit 2 
TucUUlan 0.66 5.20 3.94 5.20 3.94 
Santiago 0.61 5.20 3.99 5.20 3.99 
Cordoba 0.5"1 4.70 3.64 5.10 4.04 
Rio Cuarto 0.48 5.70 4.57 5.50 4.37 
San Luis 0.99 5.70 4.86 5.50 4.66 
1: before November 1912; 2 : after November 1 912 . 
Source: My own elaboration based on Bagley S . A. , Libro de Precios, July 1912. 
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2. INTRA-ASIAN TRADE AND EAST ASIA'S INDUSTRIALISATION, 1919-
19391 
Kaoru Sugihara (Osaka University) 
This paper discusses the effects of East Asia's industrialisation on the patterns of intra-
Asian trade during the interwar period. Recent studies have shown a strong growth of 
the Japanese economy in the 1930s based on the expansion of the domestic market, as 
well as the growth of modem industries in Korea, particularly in the second half of the 
decade.2 The high growth rates of Japan, Korea and Taiwan for the period from 1919 
to 1939 were quite out of line with the general trend of the international economy. 
China's growth record is more modest, but the relatively successful import-substitution 
industrialisation in littoral China during the 1920s is now well documented, and it is 
becoming clear that it continued into the 1930s.3 
Yet there is no standard explanation why these East Asian economies grew faster 
than the rest of the world, and what made it possible for them to do so. In Japanese 
historiography, country studies have confirmed that these economies were integrated 
into the Western-dominated world economy through trade and capital flows to a 
considerable extent and were hit by the fall in their exports to the West during the great 
depression, while the studies in trade, investment and migration within East Asia have 
shown that its economies, in and outside the yen bloc, were closely connected to one 
I This paper is an abridged translation of Chapter 4 of my Japanese-language book (patterns and 
Development of Intra-Asian Trade, Mineruva Shobo: Kyoto, 1996). In this paper Japanese names are cited 
in Western order, i.e. first name followed by surname. 
2 Kaoru Sugihara, ' Japan's Industrial Recovery, 1931-1936', in Ian Brown (ed.), The Economies of Africa 
and Asia in Inter-war Depression (Routledge: London, 1989). Kazuo Hori, ' Ryotaisenkan no Higashi Ajia 
Chiiki Shakai (Regional Societies of East Asia in the Interwar Period)', in Yuzo Mizoguchi et al. (eds), 
Ajia kara Kangaeru 6: Cholci Shakai Hendo (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai: Tokyo, 1994). 
) Kaoru Sugihara (ed.), The Growth of the Asian International Economy: The Chinese Dimension (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, forthcoming) . 
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another.4 But these studies generally lack a wider comparative perspective, and fail to 
show how important the dynamics of intra-regional trade and other contacts were in 
accounting for the region's overall divergence from the general trend. Also, 
historiography in East Asia has been coloured by an interest in the political assessment 
of Japanese imperialism, and has been inclined to take economic and political events 
outside the region as given. Contributions from students of international economic 
history have been equally unsatisfactory . In the League of Nations studies of the 
network of world trade, for example, East Asia was usually classified as temperate 
zone, while South and Southeast Asia were put under the tropical zone . Since the 
discussion of the temperate zone was usually focussed on Europe and the countries of 
recent settlement, the place of East Asia in the perceived restoration of the pre-First 
World War patterns of smooth multilateral settlement was never explicitly argued.s No 
integrated picture of Asia as a whole, including both East Asia and South and Southeast 
Asia, emerges from any of these studies either. 
Elsewhere I have argued that between 1880 and 1913 intra-Asian trade grew 
much faster than Asia's trade with the West or world trade, and that Japan's 
industrialisation and the growth of the export economies of Southeast Asia were the two 
sides of the same coin.6 The framework which I developed there had a two-tier 
structure, that is, intra-Asian trade as a discernible regional unit and the Western-
4 Yuzo Yamamoto and Kazuyoshi Oku, ' Boeki (Foreign Trade)', in Shunsaku Nishikawa and Yuzo 
Yamamoto (eds), Nihon Keizaishi, Vol.5 (Iwanami Shoten: Tokyo, 1990). Naosuke Takamura, Kindai 
Nihon Mengyo to Chugoku (The Modern Japanese Cotlon Industry and China) (Tokyo Daigaku 
Shuppankai: TokYo, 1982). Hiroshi Nishikawa, Nihon Teilcokushugi to Mengyo (Japanese Imperialism 
and the Cotlon Industry) (Mineruva Shobo: Kyoto, 1987). Yuzo Yamamoto (ed.), 'Manshukoku' no 
Kenkyu (Studies in 'Manchuk:uo7 (Kyoto Daigaku Jinbunkagaku Kenkyusho: Kyoto, 1993). 
S See, for example, League of Nations, Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade 
Balances (various years); International Trade Statistics (various years); Review of World Trade (various 
years); Network of World Trade (1942); Industrialization and Foreign Trade (1945), all published in 
Geneva. 
6 Kaoru Sugihara, 'Patterns of Asia's Integration into the World Economy, 1880-1913', in W. Fischer, R.M. 
Mclnnis and J. Schneider (eds), The Emergence ofa World Economy, 1500-1914, Vol.2 (Franz Steiner: 
Wiesbaden, 1986). Reprinted in C. Knick Harley (ed.), The integration of the World Economy, 1850-1914, 
Vol.2 (Edward EIgar: Cheltenham, U.K., 1996). 
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dominated world trade (and investment) as the dominant force of global integration. 
The former was defined as trade between Japan, China (including Hong Kong), 
Southeast Asia (the Dutch East Indies, French Indochina, Siam, the Straits Settlements 
and Burma), and India (British India excluding Burma), and between these four 
countries (or regions) and the rest of the smaller Asian economies. Figure 1 shows a 
slightly modifie<\ version of this definition, taking territorial changes into aCcount, and 
is the basis for Figure 2. 
The justification of this framework rests partly on the fact that this was the only 
intra-regional trade of a sizable scale outside the West that greatly outpaced the general 
trend of world trade. Its importance lies in the fact that by 1913 the amount of intra-
Asian trade, relative to Asia 's trade with the West, became significant for each region. 
Once trade began under the regime of 'forced free trade' with the benefit of steamships 
and railways, a relatively homogenous outlook of factor endowments, particularly the 
low cost of labour relative to capital, made intra-Asian competition fierce, and an 
international division of labour emerged where Japan became a factory of Asia and the 
rest specialised in the exports of primary products . It is this intra-Asian market 
competition that the conventional approach, based on the dichotomy between the 
Western impact and each region's response, has largely ignored. Although there is 
clearly room for arguing for some cultural, technological and institutional similarities 
across Asia, that is not an implied premise here. The diversity, as well as the similarity, 
played a role in the growth of intra-Asian trade . 
What happened to intra-Asian trade during the interwar period? Table 1 and 
Figure 3 summarise my calculations based on official country trade statistics and some 
estimates, expressed in FOB terms and converted to sterling (for the method of 
calculation of all the figures below, see Statistical Notes at the end of this paper) . Intra-
Asian trade, which in 1913 was £167 .30m, increased sharply during the First World 
War, reaching a massive £54S .S8m in 1920. With the temporary recovery of trade with 
the West in the first half of the 1920s it suffered a considerable decline, but recovered 
in the second half of the decade, maintaining a high level in the £400 millions . In the 
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early 1930s it fell sharply under the impact of the great depression, to £239.27m in 
1933. However, it showed strong recovery again in the second half of the 1930s, rising 
to £494.00m in 1939. 
A comparison of these figures with those of Asia's trade with the West (Britain, 
six industrial European countries in the Continent and the United States) is given in 
Table 1 and Figures 4 and 5. In 1913 Asia's exports to the West at £21S.06m were 
considerably greater than the intra-Asian trade figure, but in 1928 the latter slightly 
exceeded the former, and by 1938 it was 80 per cent greater than the figure for Asia's 
exports to the West. A comparison with the figures for imports from the West leads one 
to the same conclusion, that is, intra-Asian trade displayed far faster growth than Asia's 
trade with the West. If we calculate intra-Asian trade as a proportion of total world 
trade, we find that from 4.2 per cent in 1913 this increased to 6.5 per cent in 1928 and 
8.2 per cent in 1938. It was easily the second largest intra-regional trade in the world, 
next to intra-European trade.7 
What were the factors behind the growth of the relative weight of intra-Asian 
trade in world trade, and in what ways did it contribute to the economic integration of 
Asia during the interwar period? And why did this dynamism become difficult to 
maintain by the end of the 1930s? These are the questions which will be addressed in 
this paper. In the next section, the main trade links are identified, and the growth of the 
industrialisation-led trade of East Asia and its effects are outlined. In the third section 
the role of the (colonial) state in the changes in the patterns of intra-Asian trade will be 
discussed. The-last section attempts to relate the argument to the understanding of the 
nature of Japanese imperialism. 
1 Figures for world trade are from League of Nations, Review of World Trade. 1938 (1939), 60. These 
percentages are approximate, as my definition, as well as figures, of intra-Asian trade differs from that of 
the League of Nations. 
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1. The Impact of East Asia's Industrialisation 
The 'Flying Geese' Pattern of Economic Development The most important change that 
affected intra-Asian trade after the First World War was East Asia's industrialisation. 
Figure 2 presents intra-Asian trade in 1913, in 1928 and in 1938 in matrix form. 
Japan's share rose spectacularly from 22 per cent in 1913 to 28 per cent in 1928 and 
45 per cent in 1938, Korea's from 8 per cent in 1928 to 13 per cent in 1938, and 
Taiwan's from 5 per cent in 1928 to 7 per cent in 1938. This is the first nucleus of 
development created by Japanese (and later to some extent Korean) industrialisation. 
The general commodity composition did not change much there. In 1928 Japan's main 
export items' were light industrial products, especially cotton cloth, and her main import 
items from India were raw cotton, from Java sugar, from China (Manchuria) beans and 
bean products, from Korea rice and from Taiwan sugar and rice. They represented an 
expansion of the prewar pattern of the Asian international division of labour driven by 
the development of the cotton trade. In terms of broad categories of goods and 
quantities traded, this characterisation holds for the 1930s as well, despite the formation 
of trading blocs and the boycott of Japanese goods. 
Looking more closely at Japan's exports of cotton goods to Asia however, there 
were notable changes in both commodity and geographical compositions. While cotton 
yarn was the main export before the First World War, the interwar period saw a growth 
of exports of cotton cloth and other textile products . They initially consisted of 
traditional items like plain cloth, but new products were developed successfully one 
after another by private companies, often with government support, and the share of 
relatively highly processed cotton cloth such as bleached shirting, twills and sateens 
increased, while the trade also expanded to every region of Asia including South and 
Southeast Asia.8 To put this in terms of an international commodity chain, a traditional 
sequence of 'Indian raw cotton production - Japanese spinning industry - Chinese hand-
• Takeshi Abe, 'The Development of the Producing-center Cotton Textile Industry in Japan between the 
Two World Wars', Japanese Yearbook on Business History, 9 (1989), 3-27. 
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weaving' via intra-Asian trade changed to a more modem sequence of ' Indian (and 
American) raw cotton production - Japanese spinning industry - Japanese weaving 
industry' . 
An important background to this change was the development of the Chinese 
cotton industry. Its driving force was the development of the modem spinning industry 
centred on Shanghai. The raw cotton hitherto exported via Shanghai from various 
regions of China began to be used instead in Shanghai, and by the 1920s imports of raw 
cotton from India, the United States and elsewhere had come to exceed exports . 
Machine yam produced in Shanghai was gradually driving out the yarn imports from 
India and Japan. Some of this Shanghai yarn was used for locally produced native cloth 
and contributed to maintaining its competitiveness. However, a more important change 
was the step forward to the integrated mill. In the plain cotton cloth market in the 
second half of the 1920s sales of domestically produced cloth eclipsed imported cloth, 
and the shipment of cloth from Shanghai to other regions of China increased. By the 
1930s, although Shanghai maintained its central position, the growth of Chinese-owned 
spinning mills in the interior and of Japanese-owned mills in the urban areas of North 
China became conspicuous . The contribution of foreign capital, particularly in the 
Japanese-owned mills, cannot of course be ignored, but the shift to domestic production 
was a typical case of import substitution industrialisation.9 
In the field of processed dyed cotton cloth, however, imported cloth remained 
dominant, and indeed this dominance tended to grow during the 1920s. The increase 
in Japan's share, replacing Western countries', meant an intensification of more direct 
competition for the Chinese cotton industry. However, here too, as in many other fields 
domestic products began to expand, helped by protective tariffs. By the 1930s, China 
was attempting an active policy of promotion of exports of industrial products, mainly 
9 Nishikawa, Nihon Teikokushugi. Tom Kubo, 'Kindai Chugoku Mengyo no Chitai Kozo to Keiei 
Ruikei-Sono Hatten no Ronri 0 megutte--{RegionaI Variations and Finn Sizes of the Modem Chinese 
Cotton Industry: Its Logic of Development)', Tochi Seido Shigalcu, 113 (1986), 24-25. 
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to Southeast Asia. 10 In terms of the structure of trade, China showed a shift towards an 
industrial country pattern. With this export effort added to the new sequence of 
' Chinese raw cotton production - Chinese spinning industry - Chinese weaving 
industry ' , there emerged a second nucleus of East Asian industrialisation to set 
alongside JapanY 
As a country goes through the process of import substitution, imports of a 
commodity first increase, then reach saturation point, and finally decline . This pattern 
or curve tends to be repeated with a time lag for a slightly more sophisticated 
commodity, say cotton cloth rather than cotton yarn or processed cloth rather than 
plain, so that one can observe several curves of a similar shape in a graph 
chronologically charting the trend of the import structure of a country. This is the 
original formulation of the ' flying geese' pattern of economic development by Kaname 
Akamatsu. However, he also formulated a variation in which countries, rather than 
commodities, at differing stages of development develop in a 'flying geese' fashion, 
and cited as an example the relationship between Japan and China in the interwar 
period. 12 
Crucial to this pattern were strong elements of competition between the two 
countries . Judged simply from the extent of industrialisation reflected in the structure 
of trade, China at this period drew more or less level with India, and the Chinese cotton 
industry 's competitiveness in the field of low-count cotton yarn and plain cotton cloth 
urged the shift in the composition of Japan's cotton goods for export on towards the 
more processed range. Also , with the advance of Japanese spinning mills in China 
10 Toru Kubo, 'Kokumin Seifu no Yushutsu Sokushin Seisaku to Chuka Kogyo Kokugai Boeki Kyokai-
1930-nendai ni okeru Yushutsu Shiko Kogyoka no Mosaku (The Export Promotion Policy of the Chinese 
Nationalist Government and the hnperial Association ofIndusrty and Foreign Trade: A Search for Export-
oriented Industrialisation in the 1930s)', Toyo Bunka Kenkyusho Kiyo, 103 (1987), 81-113. 
11 Yukihiko Kiyokawa, ' Chugoku Seni Kikai Kogyo no Hatten to Zaikabo no Igi (The Development of 
the Chinese Textile Machinery Industry and the Significance for it of the Japanese-owned Mills in China)', 
Keizai Kenkyu, 34, I (1983), 22-39. 
12 K. Akamatsu, ' A Historical Pattern of Economic Growth in Developing Countries', Developing 
Economies, Preliminary Issue 1 ( 1962), 17-18, 20. 
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Japanese exports of spinning machinery to China saw an increase . The transfer of 
Japanese management know-how via these spinning operations in China was also 
indispensable for increasing the competitiveness of the Chinese cotton industry. Thus 
East Asia, with a sequence of 'Indian/Chinese (and American) raw cotton production 
- Japanese/Chinese spinning industry - Japanese/Chinese weaving industry - Asian 
consumption' as its axis, began to produce a regional dynamics of production and 
consumption of its own. The changes in the structure of trade outlined above were a 
reflection of the 'flying geese' pattern of development of the two countries. 
The Final D~mand Linkage Effect However, the growth of intra-Asian trade was not 
associated with a ' flying geese' pattern of development across all the regions of Asia. 
As is shown in Table 1, the weight of East Asia's trade shifted greatly from trade with 
the West to intra-Asian trade. The share of East Asia (including Korea and Taiwan) in 
intra-Asian trade, which in 1913 was no more than 45 per cent, rose to 59 per cent in 
1928 and as high as 74 per cent in 1938. In weight of trade with the West, however, 
the position of India and Southeast Asia was maintained. Industrialisation made 
relatively little progress there and the dependence on exports of primary products to 
outside the area remained vital. Looking at the geographical composition of India and 
Southeast Asia's exports to the West, we can see a shift from Britain and industrial 
Europe to the USA, and the prominence of the Dutch East Indies and Malaya in the 
increase in exports is notable. Exports of rubber from both countries expanded rapidly 
after the First World War with the growth of the automobile industry in the West, and 
as a result rubber plantations became the driving force for economic development in 
Malaya and the Dutch East Indies (and parts of Siam). 
In this respect the yen bloc looked increasingly isolated from the Western-
dominated world economy. It was the rapid rise in Japan's exports of cotton textiles and 
sundries to South and Southeast Asia that countered this isolation. When the great 
depression brought a shrinkage of trade on all fronts, Japan's (and to some extent 
China's) exports of manufactured goods continued to increase. This export boom also 
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encouraged Japan's imports of raw cotton both from the United States and India. Where 
did the purchasing power in South and Southeast Asia come from? 
As with the prewar pattern, the flnal demand linkage played a key role in 
sustaining this segment of intra-Asian trade. The more primary products were exported 
to the West, the greater the income of those workers engaged in primary production and 
related service activities in South and Southeast Asia became. Given the narure of their 
demand being largely conflned to essentials such as rice, dried fish, spices and some 
cotton textiles and sundries, the bulk of their purchasing power benefited Asian 
producers, and a signiflcant proportion of the imported manufactured goods they 
purchased came from East Asia. This is an argument which applies most fully to the 
1920s, but in order to emphasise its general applicability we cite here the case of the 
Dutch East Indies at the end of the 1930s. 
In 1938 the Dutch East Indies' exports consisted of oil, rubber, tea and sugar, 
and if one takes into account trade to the West via Singapore and Egypt, demand from 
Europe and the United States was of overwhelming importance.13 At the end of the 
1930s the increase of the military demand in the West contributed to sustaining the 
exports . Japan too was importing oil, rubber and tin, but her share in the total 
amounted to only 3 per cent, and even for oil no more than 5 per cent. On the other 
hand, the structure of the Dutch East Indies' imports in the same year consisted of (1) 
imports from the West such as machinery, steel, ships and aircraft and automobiles, (2) 
imports of cotton manufactures and other textiles from Japan and Europe, and (3) 
imports of rice, fish and other foods from other Asian countries. It is obvious that the 
demand for (2) and (3) was dependent on the purchasing power of ordinary people 
involved in the export economy of primary products . In contrast to its position in the 
export structure, Japan's share in the Dutch East Indies' total import trade was 15 per 
cent, and its share in total cotton cloth imports was as much as 41 per cent, constituting 
13 Out of the Dutch East Indies' exports to Singapore, most of the rubber, copra, tea, coffee, palm oil and 
tin were re-exported to the West. Ranryo Indo no Boeki oyobi Boeki Seisaku (Foreign Trade and Trade 
Policy of the Dutch East Indies) , (Ioa Kenkyusho: Tokyo, 1943), 101. 
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the core of (2) . Unlike the cloth of European origin, the Japanese cloth tended to be 
used for the clothing for the native population. \4 
In other words, Japan's exports went far beyond simple bilateral trade and grew 
based on the final demand linkage effect of exports from South and Southeast Asia to 
the West, and their structure remained basically unaltered in the 1930s. Demand of type 
(3) which was ~lso heavily dependent on the fmal demand linkage supported the 
commercial agriculture and fisheries of Southeast Asian countries. Although the 
overseas Chinese trading network dominated these segments of trade, intra-Asian trade 
was in fact structurally dependent on exports to the West. In the early 1940s Japan 
occupied most parts of Southeast Asia, but was unable to either make full use of the 
potential resources of the export economy or make the local economies function, once 
Western demand had been cut off. 
Thus, apart from the fact that China replaced India as the second industrial 
nation of Asia, the prewar system of the Asian international division of labour survived 
and developed further . The general contraction of trade owing to the great depression 
did temporarily expose the dependence of intra-Asian trade upon the trade with the 
West, and the blow felt in South and Southeast Asia extended to the overseas Chinese 
and Indian networks, but its effects on countries and regions varied. In South India, the 
Straits Settlements, Malaya, Siam, the Dutch East Indies, and Hong Kong the existing 
trading and financial networks became more independent, and entrepreneurs began to 
enter the fields of industry and shipping. Also, the second half of the 1930s saw a fair 
degree of recovery in trade with the West. Thus the purchasing power of South and 
Southeast Asian economies was to some extent maintained, and Japanese manufactured 
goods flowed in, and the prewar sequence of 'export of primary products from South 
and Southeast Asia to the West - stagnation of industrial development of colonies of the 
West - export of industrial products from Japan to South and Southeast Asia -
\4 Taiwan Sotokufu Kanbo Gaijika, ·Orimono Shijo to shiteno Ranryo Indo (The Dutch East Indies as a 
Cloth Market)" Vo1.2, (Manuscript, 1935?), 4, 33, 45, 90, 159. 
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industrialisation of Japan (or East Asia)' was repeated . In other words, the division of 
labour between East Asia and South and Southeast Asia did not develop in a 'flying 
geese' fashion but moved towards the direction of a widening gap in industrial 
capability between the two. 
The Effects of H~avy and Chemical Industrialisation This divergence, however, did not 
immediately impede the growth of East Asia's trade . On the contrary, the rate of 
growth of trade within East Asia, particularly that of Japan's trade with her colonies, 
went far beyond that of other segments of intra-Asian trade. Looking at Japan's trade 
structure in 1935, trade with her colonies took up 61 per cent of trade with Asia in both 
exports and imports, and had become the main source of trade surplus (Note, however, 
that most of the exports to Kwantung Province were re-exported to North China) . 
Foods (rice and sugar) were imported from Korea, Taiwan and Kwantung Province, 
and other raw materials and foods (beans and bean products) from Manchuria, while 
manufactured goods were exported to all these areas . In the case of Korea, Taiwan and 
Kwantung Province heavy and chemical industrial products predominated, while light 
industrial goods formed the major part of manufactured goods exported to Manchuria. 15 
A cursory look at the development of Korean trade suggests that she, along with 
China, appears to have joined the course of the 'flying geese' pattern of economic 
development. By the 1930s the colonial government of Korea was pursuing a policy of 
electric power development, combining the development of electricity generation with 
the expansion of a transmission grid, and carried out an industrialisation policy based 
on a combination of cheap electricity, land prices and labour. In addition, the 
expectation of an opening of the Manchurian market to Korea, and a relatively relaxed 
industrial regulatory policy encouraged direct investment of Japanese private capital. 
Thus there was an expansion of electrochemical industry and rnining-and-refining, both 
15 Yuzo Yamamoto, Nihon Shokuminchi Keizaishi Kenkyu (Studies in the Economic History of the 
Japanese Colonies), (Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai: Nagoya, 1992), 126-32. 
35 
utilising the availability of electricity, while spinning, weaving and other light industries 
grew, taking advantage of low wages. 16 The increase in exports of heavy and chemical 
industrial products from Japan and the relative stagnation of exports of cotton textiles 
reflect this development. In the 1930s indigenous industry (without Japanese 
involvement) too grew at a very rapid pace. 17 
However,. the great majority of Japan's exports of heavy and chemical industrial 
products went to her own colonies, and in this respect they differed greatly from 
exports of cotton textiles. Does this suggest that Japan remained internationally 
uncompetitive in the heavy and chemical industrial products market outside the yen 
bloc? One test is the trend of Japanese exports to China (excluding Manchuria), where 
during the interwar period there was an increase in imports of heavy and chemical 
industrial products. If we consider China's imports of machinery, in 1933 Japan already 
had an 11 per cent share of the total, focussing heavily on spinning and weaving 
machinery, and this share expanded further. By 1936-38 Japan had made great inroads 
into the Western countries' share not merely in spinning and weaving machinery but 
in a wide range of fields, such as electrical machinery, machine tools, electrical goods 
and metal products. The report of the Maritime Customs for 1936 sees an increase in 
the numbers of Chinese engineers as one reason for the growth of trade. 18 A very rapid 
shift of this kind is not found in the heavy and chemical industrial products market as 
a whole, but it can be said that the trade in machinery represented a new trend. 
On the other hand, in India's imports of machinery which were much greater 
than those of . China, the Western countries, especially Britain, maintained their 
dominance and Japan's share, even at its 1937 height, never went beyond 3 per cent. 
The main reason for the pre-eminence of the Western countries was that a high 
proportion of Indian demand was from the jute, sugar and tea industries where 
16 Ibid., 139. 
11 Kazuo Hori, 'Ryotaisenkan no Higashi Ajia', 286-88. 
I! China Maritime Customs, The Trade o/China. Annual Report/or 1938, 67. 
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traditional Western suppliers dominated, but even in the cotton industry, owing to the 
clout of Lancashire, almost all the spinning and weaving machinery was of British 
origin. Imports of machinery to Southeast Asia were also considerable, particularly in 
the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya. Here too, the share of Western countries, 
especially the country of suzerainty, was large, while Japan's share was negligible. 19 
The situation in U1e machinery field applies more or less to trade in heavy and chemical 
industrial products as a whole. 
Lastly, let us touch on the question of securing natural resources. A variety of 
factors - investment, markets, emigration, and securing raw materials and other 
resources - motivated Japan's advance into Manchuria, but, in the 1930s at least, 
Manchuria, while absorbing vast amounts of capital and manpower, failed to become 
an adequate supply base for the raw materials and resources needed by Japan. In fact, 
the latter 's need to import these from outside the yen bloc increased. As Toichi Nawa 
made clear, Japan's main economic motive for the advance into North." China was to 
secure the American-type long-staple raw cotton produced there, and this was also one 
of the most important reasons why the Chinese spinners of Shanghai and the Nationalist 
government resisted it. Intra-East Asian competition in the cotton trade was the most 
important economic factor behind the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. 
Furthermore, the stronger China's resistance, the heavier Japan's burden became. Even 
if such conflict had been resolved, Japan would still have been largely dependent on the 
West for raw fibres and for the raw materials for her heavy and chemical industries . 
With regard to "the latter, she relied on British Malaya and Australia for iron ore, India 
for pig iron, Canada for alurninum and lead, Canada and Australia for zinc, British 
Malaya for rubber, and the United States and the Dutch East Indies for oil, and it was 
practically impossible to envisage autarky while at the same time pursuing rapid heavy 
19 Nanpo Sangyo Gijutsu Yoran Hensankai, Nanpo Sangyo Gijutsu Yoran (Handbook of Industrial 
Technology in Southeast Asia), (Sankaido: Tokyo, 1944), 358. 
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and chemical industrialisation.20 It is well-known that the American oil embargo was 
an immediate cause behind the outbreak of the Pacific War. 
To sum up, the existing international division of labour in Asia was not to 
provide a basis for the development of Japan's heavy and chemical industries, in terms 
either of finding markets or securing natural resources . The diversification of Japan's 
demand for natural resources revealed the limits of dependence on regional trade. On 
the other hand, if Japan had engaged in real competition with the Western countries 
throughout the whole Asian market for heavy industrial products, including South and 
Southeast Asia, this would have meant a fundamental change in the relationship 
between intra-Asian trade as a regional unit and the trade between the West and Asia 
which underpinned it as a global force, towards a more equal footing. That would have 
been politically threatening to the Western countries. Thus the ' flying geese' pattern 
of development was confined to East Asia, and remained part of the Asian international 
division of labour whose reverse side was the development of primary producer 
economies in South and Southeast Asia. This represented a fundamental limit to the 
autonomy of intra-Asian trade. 
2. Exchange Rates, Tariffs and Colonialism 
After the First World War the power and influence of the West in Asia visibly declined. 
The acquisition of new territories decreased sharply, and within the colonies the 
recruitment of native government officials and a degree of transfer of power took place. 
The forces supporting the Asian free trade sphere shifted at least partially to Japan, to 
China which had been given tariff autonomy, and to the Straits Settlements which 
resisted the preferential tariffs plan of Britain at Ottawa. The rise of Asian nationalism 
gradually changed the system of purely Western-led' forced free trade' . An important 
consequence of this was that, while the Western countries to some extent succeeded in 
20 Kaoru Sugihara, 'The Economic MotivatiODS behind Japanese Aggression in the late 1930s: Perspectives 
of Freda Utley and Nawa Toichi', Journal o/Contemporary History, 32, 2 (1997), 259-80. 
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maintaining their interests in South and Southeast Asia, in East Asia, whose 
independence was relatively stronger, they effectively ratified its industrialisation. We 
compare below the changes in the two economic sub-regions, East Asia and South and 
Southeast Asia, in terms of currency movements and tariffs, and examine the effects 
of this shift in international power structure on intra-Asian trade. We also discuss the 
relationship between the formation of trading blocs and intra-Asian trade. 
Exchange Rates From the end of the nineteenth century the currencies of most Asian 
countries became linked to gold in order to facilitate investment in Asia by the Western 
powers, and Asia appeared split into a silver-using area, centring on China, and the 
gold standard or gold exchange standard countries. However, from the point of view 
of the movement of exchange rates which affected intra-Asian competition during the 
interwar period, it is more important to focus on the contrast between East Asia and 
South and Southeast Asia . As Figure 6 shows, while the currencies of Jndia, Burma, 
Thailand, British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies tended to remain steady or to rise 
against sterling, those of Japan (and the yen bloc), China, Hong Kong and French 
Indochina displayed a very different movement. In the 1930s there was a great decline 
relative to sterling (hence also to the dollar). 
It is true that the temporary rise in the value of China's currency due to 
America's silver purchases in the first half of the 1930s worked to the disadvantage of 
China's exporting interests and import substitution industrialisation. Then in 1935, after 
the visit of Leith-Ross, China 's currency came to be linked, though indirectly, to 
sterling, and to that extent it seemed as if the interests of Britain and her allies had been 
secured. But, looking at the movements of the interwar period as a whole, these efforts 
were more than offset by China's devaluation drive?1 The movements of China's and 
21 Torn Kubo, ·Heisei Kaikaku Iko no Chugoku Keizai (The Chinese Economy since the Currency 
Refonn)' , in Yutaka Nozawa (ed.), Chugoku no Heisei Kaikaku to Kokusai Kankei (Tokyo Daigaku 
Shuppankai: Tokyo, 1981), 107-8. 
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Japan's currencies were quite similar, and, in spite of the political conflicts between the 
two countries, there emerged an East Asian 'devaluation sphere' . 
The divergence in the movements of exchange rates greatly affected the pattern 
of Asia's international division of labour. It ensured the conditions for import 
substitution in East Asia, and facilitated exports of East Asian manufactured goods to 
South and Southeast Asia . The latter in turn received inexpensive manufactured goods 
from East Asia using the earnings from the exports to the West, thus enjoying the full 
gains from their trade. For China too, the decision to follow the yen bloc's devaluation 
was clearly an important factor which enabled her to maintain her international 
competitiveness in the Asian market. On the other hand, the value of South and 
Southeast Asian currencies was fixed under the influence of the Western powers. There 
was no prospect of any government helping the 'flying geese' pattern of development 
spreading to that part of Asia in the 1930s. 
Tariff Policy The competition during the second half of the 1920s and the first half of 
the 1930s between Japan, India and Britain in the Indian market of cotton textiles 
triggered the formation of trading blocs in Asia. The increase in the 1920s in the 
exports of cotton textiles from Japan to India attracted the attention of the Indian cotton 
industry and the colonial government, and as a result of the 1926 Tariff Board report 
the cotton import duties were raised in 1927. While this reduced the imports of 
Japanese cotton yam, low-priced cotton yam spun in Japanese mills in China and 
coloured cotton cloths from Japan, both outside the purview of the raised tariff rates, 
flowed in large quantities. In response the Cotton Industry Protection Law was passed 
in 1930, which was followed by a series of tariff rises mainly relating to cotton cloth. 
Although the colonial government had been granted tariff autonomy in 1921, the 
interests of Britain were inevitably strongly reflected in India's tariff policy, and in the 
law of 1930 'preferential' tariffs charging lower rates on British goods were 
introduced. As is well known, this opened the way for the system of preferential tariffs 
within the British Empire, in other words the formation of trading blocs, at the Ottawa 
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Conference. However, this law, which was supposed to protect the Indian cotton 
industry from Japanese competition was not, in the event, able to do so. The 
composition of Japanese exports shifted from coarse to fine cloth and from plain to 
bleached, partially usurping the position of British-made cloth, and exports expanded 
from 1931, taking advantage of yen devaluation. In 1933 the colonial government, in 
breach of the Indo-Japan Trade Treaty, imposed a prohibitively high duty of 75 per cent 
on Japanese-made cotton cloth. Japan retaliated with a boycott of Indian raw cotton, 
precipitating the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations which began in that year. After a 
series of Japan-India-Britain meetings, a new line was drawn in 1934 based on tariffs 
and quotas. ' Further twists and turns followed, but efforts to continue the trade 
prevailed.22 In response to the increasingly protectionist stance of China and India, 
Japan expanded her export horizons to other Asian countries and also as far afield as 
Africa and Latin America, and this further propagated protectionist reactions in many 
countries. 
In assessing the significance of the above negotiations, it is important to note that 
Japan's share of India 's imports showed a tendency to rise through the 1930s. Even 
after the Indo-Japanese trade negotiations Japan made inroads in many types of goods 
in which there was no obvious direct competition with Indian industry or where the 
tariffs were relatively low. These were mainly light industrial goods, notably rayon 
textiles and sundries, and included a large number of items too small and too diverse 
to classify and apply tariff rates effectively to . Meanwhile, the share of Western 
countries was falling. Also, India's exports to Japan did not expand as much as her 
imports from there, while India's exports to the West continued to account for the 
n Haruka Yanagisawa, 'Daiichiji Nichi-In Kaisho 0 meguru Ei-In Kankei (Anglo-Indian Relations in the 
First Indo-Japanese Trade Negotiations)', Keizai to Boeki, 129 (1980), 30-47. Hiroshi Nishikawa, Nihon 
Teikoku Shugi to Mengyo, Chapter 5. Naoto Kagotani, 'Nichi-In Kaisho (1933-34) no Rekishiteki 19i-
1930-nendai Zenhan no Nihon Mengyo to Seifu- (The Historical Significance of the Indo-Japanese Trade 
Negotiations of 1933-34: [The Relationship between) the Japanese Cotton Industry and the Japanese 
Government in the First Half of the 1930s", Tochi Seido Shigaku, 117 (1987),22-39. B. Chatterji, Trade, 
Tariffs, and Empire: Lancashire and British Policy in India, 1919-1939, (Oxford University Press: Debli, 
1992), Chapters 8 and 9. 
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overwhelming majority of her exports. Similarly, after the Dutch-Japanese trade 
negotiations of 1934, which were held in parallel with the Indo-Japanese negotiations, 
Japan's share of the Dutch East Indies' imports, though declining slightly, did not 
return to the pre-1930 level. More generally, the framework of free trade was 
maintained in other Southeast Asian countries.23 In other words, the formation of 
trading blocs in South and Southeast Asia served the purpose of drawing the lines in a 
struggle for the share between the imperialist powers to some extent, but did not 
destroy intra-Asian trade. Rather, it was the latter, represented in the will to secure and 
develop the export economies of primary products, rather than the interests of Western 
industry or of colonies' domestic industry, that prevailed. 24 
Why did the logic of free trade prevail under colonialism? One reason was the 
importance and visibility of the gains from trade. Japan was the largest customer for 
India's raw cotton and also an important export destination for her pig iron. Imports of 
Japanese cotton goods and sundries were desirable for Indian consumers, and imports 
of Japanese textile machinery were desirable for the development of the Indian cotton 
industry, so long as the Japanese products did not directly compete with Indian goods. 
In the Dutch East Indies too, the Javanese batik industry was using imported Japanese-
made cambric, and Japan received some support from the local industry in her attempt 
to halt the move to import restrictions. 25 However, perhaps a more important 
2J Denis Soo Jin Koh and Kyoko Tanaka, ' Japanese Competition in the Trade of Malaya in the 1930s', 
Southeast Asian Studies, 21, 4 (1984), 374-99. Nihon Biruma Kyokai, Nihon Biruma Shin Tsusho Joyaku 
oyobi Menpu Giteisho to Saikin no Biruma Jijyo (The New Commercial Treaty and the Cotton Textiles 
Agreement between Burma and Japan and the Recent Situation of Burma), (Tokyo 1937), 1-34. Yoshiro 
Umino, 'Nihon to Indoshina no Boeki Masatsu (The Trade Conflict between Japan and French 
Indochina)', in Chihiro Hosoya (ed.), Taiheiyo ·Ajia ken no Kolcusai Keizai Hunsoshi (Tokyo Daigaku 
Shuppankai: Tokyo, 1983), 41-64. 
24 It has been sugggested that Britain was rather slow in pursuing the export market for India, as is seen 
in her attitude towards the exploration of the Manchurian market See Yanagisawa, 'Daiichiji Nichi-In 
Kaisho', 44-45. While it is true that Britain suggested giving up the Manchurian market in exchange for 
imperial protection during the negotiations, it must also be noted that these proposals were eventually 
withdrawn. 
2S Yoshitada Murayama, 'Daiichiji Nichi-Ran Kaisho-Nihon no Yuwateki Keizai Shinshutsu no 
Tenkanten (The First Dutch-Japanese Trade Negotiations: A Turning Point of the Japanese Appeasement 
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underlying cause lay in the fact that the economic purpose of the British rule in India 
was basically to ensure smooth payment (of interest, home charges, etc.) from India to 
Britain, and the adoption of a sound monetary policy was essential .26 While devaluation 
of the yen helped the maintenance of Japanese exports in the South and Southeast Asian 
markets, it must not be forgotten that the rupee was revalued against sterling in 1924 
and, despite the repeated demands for devaluation made by Indian capitalists, it 
remained fIxed at a high level throughout the 1930s (see Figure 7) .27 Lancashire was 
entirely left out of the picture in monetary policy decisions .28 In other words, the 
formation of trading blocs was only a part of an overall British strategy for protecting 
the empire as a whole. Taking an integrated view of Britain's interests in India, it is not 
surprising that fmancial and service interests were given priority. A similar argument 
on the dominance of fInancial considerations in the Dutch East Indies' economic policy 
has been recently put forward by Naoto Kagotani. 29 
By contrast, China was starting to adopt a genuine policy of industrialisation. 
Her industrial policy programme included promotion of invention, promotion of trade, 
establishment of fmancial institutions for commerce and industry, organisation and 
improvement of trade associations, and arbitration between capital and labour.30 Also, 
responding to the demands from industrial capitalists, the Nationalist government, 
Policy of Economic Expansion)" in Hajime Shimizu (ed.), Nihon ·Tonan Ajia Kankeishi I : Ryotaisekanld 
Nihon·Tonan Ajia Kankei no Shoso (Ajia Keizai Kenkyusho: Tokyo, 1986), 87-117. 
26 A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990 (Longman: London. 1993), 
177. 
27 B.R. Tomlinson, The Political Economy of the Raj, 1914-1947: The Economics of De colonization in 
India (Macmillan: London, 1979), 73-78. 
21 J.D. Tomlinson, ' The Rupee Pound Exchange in the 19205', Indian Economic and Social History 
Review, 15-2 (1978),145. 
29 Naoto Kagotani, ' Japanese Cotton-textile Diplomacy in the 19305', paper presented to the workshop 
' Britain and East Asian International Relations in the 19305', 11 th November 1996 at the Osaka University 
of Foreign Studies. 
3{) Mantetsu Chosaka, Kokumin Seifu no Sangyo Seisaku (The Industrial Policy of the Nationalist 
Government) , (publisher and place of publication unknown: 1930),81-84. 
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taking advantage of the conflict of interests of the great powers, from 1927 gradually 
gained tariff autonomy, and pursued a policy of protective tariffs for industrialisation.31 
In sum, the tariff policy, instead of remedying the distortion caused by the split 
movement of exchange rates, actually worked to aggravate it. 
Colonialism Among the imperialist powers there were two different approaches to their 
colonies, the Japanese/American, which asserted strong ties with the suzerain country, 
and the British/Dutch, which should be called free trade imperialism.32 The latter 
represented the mainstream in Asia, which is why we have argued that the formation 
of trading biocs was an attempt to reorganise, rather than deny, iJltra~Asian trade to 
protect the interests of the suzerain COUJltry. For Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, 
trade more or less meant trade with the suzerain COUJltry. But for India, Burma, British 
Malaya or the Dutch East Indies, trade with the suzerain COUJltry was a very small 
proportion of the colony's total trade (see Table 2). The policy aim of the powers 
adopting a British/Dutch type arrangement was retention of their economic interests 
under changing trade relations, rather than isolation. The contrasting imperialist policies 
affected the ways in which colonies were integrated into intra-Asian trade. We examine 
below the cases of India and Japanese colonies . 
Although India has a long history of industrial policy dating back to the 
nineteenth century, she never had a comprehensive industrialisation strategy equivalent 
to that of Japan or China. Quite apart from the predominance of financial considerations 
in British policy, there were other hindrances to the implementation of industrial policy 
for Indian industry. For example, in spite of the fact that the spread of new textile 
31 Toru Kubo, 'Nankin Seifu no Kanzei Seisaku to sono Rekishiteki Jgi (Tariff Policy of the Nationalist 
Government and its Historical Significance)', Tochi Seido Shigaku, 86 (1980), 38-55. Ditto., ' 1930-nendai 
Chugoku no Kanzei Seisaku to Shihonka Kaikyu (China's Tariff Policy in the 1930s and the Capitalist 
Class)', Shakai Keizai Shigaku, 47, I (1981), 42-64. Ditto., 'Kokumin Seifu ni yoru Kanzei Jishuken no 
Kaihuku Katei (The Nationalist Governmenrs Road to Tariff Autonomy)', Toyo Bunka Kenlcyusho Kiyo, 
98 (1985), 347-93. 
32 This classification is based on the degree of colonial (trade) ties with the suzerain country. In terms of 
the suzerain country's commitment to free trade, however, Japan rather resembles Britain. See below. 
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machinery in India was generally slow,33 the 1932 India Tariff Board took a negative 
attitude towards the adoption of powerlooms, arguing that diffusion of powerlooms was 
not appropriate for India where standardisation was not in progress, and that according 
to the comparative experiments conducted in Lancashire powerlooms had been found 
more costly than existing machines. This was in spite of the comment by Arno Pearce, 
general secretary of the International Master Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers' 
Association in Manchester and a most informed observer, that Toyoda automatic 
powerlooms had been tried in Madras with success. 34 In the experiments cited as 
evidence, only British-made machines of poor efficiency were used, and ones of 
Japanese or European manufacture were never considered. It is clear from this and 
other episodes that in India where people were accustomed to copy what was done in 
Lancashire, there was an atmosphere of acceptance of such pronouncements.35 In 1934 
a temporary increase in imports of Japanese spinning machines was reported but there 
was in the end no great diffusion of Japanese textile machinery of any kind. 
By contrast, it would seem at first sight that Japan's colonies, with the advantage 
of currency devaluation and the strong links with the colonial power's growing 
economy, developed at a rapid pace and experienced progress in industrialisation. 
However, a strong tie with Japan cannot be viewed as a result of the working of natural 
market forces. While in the process of her own modernisation Japan operated as a 
' rational shopper', selectively importing technology and organisations from the West, 
she hardly permitted her colonies any direct trade with the West. Figures for Korea's 
and Taiwan's trades with other Asian countries were also very small. In the 1930s 
Korea and Taiwan had the potential to expand exports by taking advantage of the 
33 Yukihiko Kiyokawa, 'Technical Adaptations and Managerial Resources in India: A Study of the 
Experience of the Cotton Textile Industry from a Comparative Viewpoint', Developing Economies, 21, 
2 (1983), 97-133. 
34 Report of the Indian Tariff Board Regarding the Grant of Protection to the Cotton Textile Industry 
(Calcutta, 1932),65-67. Amo S. Pearse, The Cotton Industry of India (International Federation of Master 
Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers' Associations: Manchester, 1930), 9. 
3> A.K. Bagchi, Private Investment in India (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1972), 255-56. 
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currency devaluation and of investment and imports of machines from Japan, in the 
same way as China did. Indeed Korea's and Taiwan's exports to Manchuria increased 
during that decade, but exports to regions of Asia outside the yen bloc did not expand 
much, and neither colony entered directly into the world of intra-Asian competition. 
While Japan herself penetrated into China and the Western countries ' colonies in South 
and Southeast A$ia, trading blocs meant real blocs for Korea and Taiwan, in the very 
period when the possibility of export-led industrialisation existed. This clearly restricted 
the natural development of intra-Asian trade and impeded the dynamism arising from 
intra-Asian competition. Bearing in mind the development since the Second World War 
it is appropriate to emphasise how costly this aspect of formation of trading blocs was 
for the colonised, as well as for intra-Asian dynamism as a whole. 
In the sense that the stagnation of Indian industry and the industrialisation of 
Korea and Taiwan were both results of policies designed to further the interests of the 
suzerain country, they had the same effect of distorting the natural development of 
Asia 's international division of labour. By the 1930s the international order under 
imperialism was beginning to show its inability to embrace the full potential of intra-
regional trade driven by East Asia's industrialisation. 
3. The Nature of Japanese Imperialism 
From the above discussion three points could be made with regard to the historiography 
of Japanese imperialism. First, since the days of the Marxist debate on the nature of 
Japanese capitalism in the 1930s, there has been a hesitation to refer to the positive 
aspects of the integration of Asian economies for fear of seeming to be trying to justify 
Japanese expansionism. Attention has been focussed on conflicts rather than 
cooperation, and particularly on the role of the state and the formation of trading blocs. 
Thus the role the powerful network of overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia 
played was overlooked, and the world system came to be perceived merely as a 
collection of nation states or imperial blocs. As a result Asia 's relative economic 
independence from the West and the region 's interconnectedness went unnoticed, and 
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Asian international economic history has been written as if all the major forces and 
changes could be summarised in terms of the contrast between the economic fragility 
of Japan which needed economic interdependence and the legitimacy of the Chinese 
Communist Party 's determination to cut off such a linkage. It must be pointed out that 
behind this bias was the political and intellectual influence of the Comintern and the 
international communist movement in general. 
However, the increase of economic interdependence within Asia had the positive 
side of moderating the effects of the great depression, realising gains from trade, and 
promoting industrialisation. Unless this aspect is recognised, it is impossible to establish 
the importance of the question of how Asia 's international economic cooperation could 
have been achieved. The lack of a methodological framework within which to discuss 
this issue seems to me to have constituted a critical weakness shared by both Japanese 
academia and the idea behind Mao Zedong's revolution. 
Secondly, although Japanese imperialism did not have the power by itself to 
create an international order underpinning intra-Asian trade, it did play an important 
role in maintaining it through both its cooperation with and its resistance to the Western 
powers . In the first half of the 1930s two competing programmes were actively 
pursued, partly in opposition to each other but also in practice complementing each 
other. One was the idea of developing the yen exchange bloc originating from 
Junnosuke Inoue,36 and the other of the expansion of the yen bloc backed by military 
force . The former was designed to build an international order which would secure a 
relationship between Japan and the overseas Chinese trading network as the core of the 
Asian international division of labour. In more general terms it was to create an order 
under which economic interdependence between East Asia and South and Southeast 
Asia could be ensured. The latter pursued, more directly, a fuller integration of East 
Asian economies. 
36 Masayoshi Tsurumi, ·En-kawaseken Koso to sono Genjitsu- Daiichij i Taisenki ni okeru Teikoku Nihon 
no Taigai Seisaku (The Programme for the Yen-exchange Bloc and its Implementation: Imperial Japan's 
External Policy during the First World War)', Keizaigalcu Zasshi, 67, 3 (1972), 43-65. 
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As is clear from the account given in this paper, each programme had its 
economic basis, and in considering the nature of Japanese imperialism both aspects 
must be understood in a coherent way. Put simply, it was an 'imperialism of free 
trade' ,37 aiming at free trade if possible, but ready for territorial expansion if necessary. 
It should of course be noted that, unlike Britain, Japan was a minor imperial power, 
and its inclination to free trade was dependent on the international order led by the 
Western powers. Thus it was crucially important for Japan to maintain the international 
division of labour in Asia by means of cooperation with the West. The strategy was to 
expand the yen bloc while also maintaining and expanding the yen exchange bloc. One 
cannot understand this position of Japan if one restricts the study of Japanese 
imperialism to the formal empire consisting of Korea, Taiwan and others and the 
informal empire represented by Manchuria. 38 
Furthermore, the relative increase in Japan's economic influence inside the 
Western countries' colonies to some extent justified this Japanese stance, and gave 
Japan sufficient pull to put pressure for a practical compromise on the formation of 
trading blocs by the Western powers . In the existing literature, Japan' s dependence on 
the market inside the British empire has been understood as a reflection of Japan's 
vulnerability. In fact the colonial dominance of the West at this period was weakening 
and maintenance of economic relations with Japan, provided their colonial rule was not 
threatened, was considered desirable. For example, the colonial government of British 
Malaya, while outwardly condemning Japan's invasion of China, from the viewpoint 
of guarding the colony's economic interests took an attitude of indifference to overseas 
Chinese sending money to help resistance in China and to the boycott of Japanese 
)1 J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, ' The Imperialism of Free Trade', Economic History Review, 2nd series, 
6, I (1953), 1-15. 
11 Against the background of a rapid increase of Japanese exports to Southeast Asia, the trade settlement 
mechanism through the yen-exchange bloc did become more important in the first half of the 1930s. See 
Tatsuyuki Yoshihara, "Senkanki Nihon no tai 'Nanpo' Boeki Kinyu no Kozo-Yokohama Shokin Ginko, 
Taiwan Ginko 0 chushinni (The Structure of Japanese Trade Finance in Southeast Asia in the Interwar 
Period: With reference to the Yokoharna Specie Bank and the Taiwan Bank)" in Hajime Shimizu (ed.), 
Nihon ·Tonan Ajia Kankeishi 1, 202. 
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goodS.39 In other words, in the Asia of the 1930s, Japan practised a system of ' one-
sided penetration' into the Asian markets. The strength of intra-Asian trade was both 
a cause and a result of this shifting balance of power in the international order. 
However, third, formation of a political order which would support a long-term 
development of intra-Asian trade would have had to permit a natural' flying geese' 
pattern of development of all countries of Asia, and in the end that was riot possible 
without their independence. It was in this point that the ultimate basis of the inability 
of Japanese imperialism to link itself with Asia's economic nationalism lay. During the 
1930s, neither the West nor Japan showed any will to promote a 'flying geese' pattern 
of development of the countries in South and Southeast Asia. At the Great East Asia 
Conference of 1943 Japan proposed independence for the peoples of Asia, which had 
not been included on the Atlantic Charter, but it was at a moment when the war was 
going badly for Japan, and this was little more than propaganda. 
In the 1930s Japan tried to promote industrialisation in Korea and Manchuria, 
but the rapid industrialisation within the yen bloc and the restraint put on 
industrialisation in South and Southeast Asia were both the result of the suzerain 
countries, in pursuit of their own gain, imposing an imperialist international order on 
their colonies. To enable a further development of intra-Asian trade, the formation of 
a system fully compatible with industrialisation-led trade was necessary, and under such 
a system each Asian country would have been pursuing import substitution policies by 
currency devaluation and by setting up tariff protection for infant industries, as well as 
by implementing industrial policy. The Chinese case can be said to have realised that 
potential to some extent, but even there China's ability to execute such policies as an 
independent nation was severely restricted. 
39 Mantetsu Toa Keizai Chosakyoku, 'Eiryo Mare, Birurna oyobi Goshu ni okeru Kakyo (The Overseas 
Chinese in British Malaya, Bunna and Australia)', Nanyo Kakyo Sosho 5 (Mantetsu Toa Keizai 
Chosakyoku: 1941), 582-90. 
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Most Asian countries achieved independence after passing through the Second 
World War and various vicissitudes under the Cold War regime, and eventually gained 
the right to decide their own economic policy . Postwar independence was a necessary, 
though by no means sufficient, condition for the smooth development of 
industrialisation-led trade. The growth of intra-Asian trade during the interwar years 
exposed the sigpificance of the role of the nation state for economic deVelopment, 
thereby paving the way for political change. 
STATISTICAL NOTES 
General 
• Deftnition of trade: Private merchandise trade, excluding re-exports , has been 
preferred. Treasure and government trade are omitted . 
• Territorial deftnitions: Priority was given to chronological consistency, and accurate 
naming was sometimes sacriftced for reasons of simplicity (e.g. Manchwia throughout 
rather than Manchukuo). Burma, though she becomes independent in 1937, is treated 
here as if she had been independent throughout. Hence the coastal trade between British 
India and British Burma is included in intra-Asian trade. All the trade between the ftve 
Southeast Asian countries (see Figure 1) is excluded from intra-Asian trade, partly to 
bypass the complications arising from territorial changes in what later became British 
Malaya, and partly to avoid the double-counting of Southeast Asia's trade with other 
regions via the Straits Settlements. My estimate of a 'genuine' intra-Southeast Asian 
trade, including both direct trade and trade via the Straits Settlements [say between 
Burma and the Dutch East Indies] but excluding trade between the Straits Settlements 
and other parts of Malaya, for the year 1913 for example, is £9 million. This may be 
legitimately added to the total ftgure of intra-Asian trade. Similarly, China and Hong 
Kong are treated as one unit, and the trade between them is not counted. After 1933 
Manchuria's trade disappears from the Chinese Maritime Customs' figures, so I have 
added to them the statistics collected by the new government of Manchukuo. However, 
the trade between China and Manchuria is not counted. The total trade figures for 
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China in Table 1 derive mostly from Chinese official figures , while the figures for 
China's trade with Asian countries are estimated from other countries' data, including 
Japan's . Since the latter includes smuggling while the former does not, the sum of 
China's trade with the West and China's trade with Asian countries sometimes exceeds 
the total trade figure. 
• FOB-CIF conversion: All the calculations that do not specifically state whether they 
refer to exports or imports, such as ' value of intra-Asian trade' are based on export 
figures in FOB prices. Wherever export figures are unavailable and import figures were 
used instead, I converted them to export figures , assuming that the latter would be 93 
per cent of the former, that is , assuming that the cost of freight and irisurance would 
be approximately 7 per cent of the FOB value of the merchandise. This is an important 
assumption behind my estimate of geographical composition of China's trade . 
• Exchange rates : An annual average figure for direct exchange rates between local 
currency and sterling from official trade statistics has been preferred. Some of them 
differ significantly from the rates converted via the dollar, which is sometimes used in 
the League of Nations studies. 
• Share in world trade: The League of Nations studies were inconsistent in their views 
on intra-yen-bloc trade. They often ignored this segment of intra-Asian trade altogether, 
as a result of which the volume of intra-Asian trade was grossly underestimated . For 
example, if we use figures in The Network of World Trade (1942), the share of intra-
Asian trade in world trade changed only from 6.3 per cent in 1928 to 6.4 per cent in 
1938. 
India and Burma 
• Trade statistics: Annual Statement of the Sea-borne Trade of British India 
(Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics , India) . Annual Statement of the 
Sea-borne Trade and Navigation of Burma (The Superintendent Government Printing, 
Rangoon). For Burma's trade for 1937-9, see ibid. for the year 1945-46. Before 1932 
the total coastal trade figures included intra-Burmese trade, so they were deducted from 
the calculation. 
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• Exchange rates: Statistical Abstract for the Several British Oversea Dominions and 
Protectorates. Statistical Abstract for the British Empire. Statistical Abstract for the 
British Commonwealth. 
Siam 
• Trade statistics: Foreign Trade and Navigation of the Port of Bangkok (Statistical 
Office, H.S.M. Customs, Bangkok). Foreign Trade and Navigation of the Kingdom of 
Siam. Annual Statement of the Foreign Trade and Navigation of the Kingdom of Siam. 
Annual Statement of the Foreign Trade and Navigation of the Ki1lgdom of Thailand. 
Includes re-exports. Figures to 1928 are for Bangkok only. However, 80 to 90 per cent 
of the trade went through the port of Bangkok. Total figures are available from 1920, 
but were not used here for the geographical composition was not found . 
• Exchange rates: The same sources were used except for 1931 and 1932 when official 
rates diverged significantly from the market rates. For these years I made an estimate 
on the basis of the gold parity ratio contained in League of Nations, Economic 
Intelligence Service, Statistical Year-book, 1937/38,226-35. 
British Malaya 
• Trade statistics: For 1913 to 1920, I have used Statistical Abstract for the Several 
British Oversea Dominions and Protec;torates, 1924, and supplemented it wherever 
necessary by Colony of the Straits Settlements Blue Book (Government Printing Office, 
Singapore). For 1921 to 1937, British Malaya, Return of Imports and Exports 
(Government Printing Office, Singapore), and for 1938 to 1939, Malaya, The Foreign 
Trade of Malaya (Government Printing Office, Singapore) . For 1913 to 1917, figures 
refer to the Straits Settlements only. For 1918 to 1920 they refer to the total trade of 
the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States (FMS). For 1921 to 1939 they 
refer to the total trade of the Straits Settlements, FMS and the Unfederated Malay 
States. All the trade between these three territorial units were omitted. Separate figures 
exist for FMS for 1907 to 1917, but they were not used here, for FMS's direct trade 
with countries outside Southeast Asia was negligible. 
• Exchange rates: As per India and Burma. 
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French Indochina 
• Trade statistics: For 1913-32, Bulletin Economique De L'Indochine (Direction Des 
Affaires Economiques, Gouvernement General De L'Indochine, Hanoi) . For 1933-4, 
Commerce Exterieur De L'Indochine (Administration Des Douanes et Regies 
Republique Francaise Gouvernement General De L'Indochine, Hanoi). For 1935-9, 
Annuaire Statistique De L'Indochine (Direction Des Affaires Econ6miques et 
Administratives Bureau De La Statistique General, Gouvernement General De 
L'Indochine, Hanoi) . 
• Exchange rates: For 1913-22, Rapport An Ministre Des Finances (Administration Des 
Monnaies et Medailles, Paris) . For 1923-39, Annual Statistique De L'Indochine. In the 
latter source, the rate at Saigon was used . 
The Dutch East Indies 
• Trade statistics: For 1913-25, Statistiek van den handel de Scheepvaart en de in-en 
vitvoe"echten in Nederlandsch-Indie (Departement van Landbouw, Nijverheid en 
Handel, Batavia) . For 1926-39, Jaaroverzicht van den in-en uitvoer van Nederlandsch-
Indie (Departement van Economische Zaken, Batavia) . 
• Exchange rates: P. Creutzberg and J. 1. M. van Laanen (eds), Changing Economy in 
Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source Material from the early 19th Century up to 
1940, Vol. 6, Money and Banking, 1816-1940 (The Hague, 1980) 126-9. 
China 
• Trade statistics: China Imperial Maritime Customs, Returns of Trade and Trade 
Reports (title changes) . The currency unit was Haikwan tael until 1932 when it was 
changed to yuan or standard dollar. Manshukoku Gaikoku Boeki Tokei Nenpo . 
• Exchange rates: Liang-lin Hsiao, China's Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864-1949 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1974). Hsiao chooses the market rate, rather 
than the official rate for 1938-9, which is followed here. For Manchuria, the currency 
was first converted to Japanese yen, using the rates in Manshu Chuo Ginkoshi 
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Kenkyukai (ed.), Manshu Chuo Ginkoshi - Tsuka, Kinyu Seisaku no Kiseki (Toyo 
Keizai Shinposha, 1988), and then was further converted to sterling, using Japanese 
exchange rates. 
Hong Kong 
• Trade statistics: The figure for the total trade of China comes from the Chinese 
Maritime Customs data (Plus Manchuria's), which includes China 's trade with Hong 
Kong. That is, we treat China's trade as if it were the trade of China and Hong Kong. 
China's trade with Hong Kong was very large, and most of it was re-exported from 
Hong Kong to other countries or was originally imported from countries other than 
Hong Kong.' Thus I have attempted to estimate the ' real' geographical ' composition of 
China's trade with Hong Kong, Le ., the fmal destination of China's exports to Hong 
Kong and the countries of origin of China's imports from Hong Kong . Separate trade 
statistics for Hong Kong exist for 1918 to 1924 and for 1931 to 1938 in Hong Kong 's 
Blue Books, and have been used for this purpose. For other years, figures have been 
created, taking into account the general trend obtained from the Hong Kong statistics 
mentioned above, information from other countries' trade statistics regarding their trade 
with Hong Kong, and information on Hong Kong's own production and consumption. 
• Exchange rates: As per China. 
Japan 
• Trade statistics: Dainihon Gaikoku Boeki Nenpyo. Teikoku Tokei Nenkan . I have used 
the total figures in Ippei Yamazawa and Yuzo Yamamoto, Choki Keizai Tokei 14: Boeki 
to Kokusai Shushi (Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1979), which exclude the trade with 
unknown destination or countries of origin, and therefore are slightly smaller than the 
usually cited figures. I have not made FOB-CIF adjustments regarding Japan's trade 
with Korea and Taiwan, following the usual practice. 
• Exchange rates: Yamazawa and Yamamoto, Choki Keizai Tokei 14. 
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Korea and Taiwan 
• Trade statistics: Teikoku Tokei Nenkan . Toshiyuki Mizoguchi and Mataji Umemura 
eds, Kyu Shokuminchi Keizai Tokei: Suikei to Bunseki (Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1988) . 
• Exchange rates : Their currencies moved with the Japanese yen. 
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TABLE 2 
.roportlon of Trade "lIh Ihe Suzerain Counlry 
In Asian Colonl" , 1928, 1938 (pcr tenl ) 
sUI'.crnin 1928 193R 
counl ry exports imports exports inlPort.\ 
India Bri tain 24 39 3-1 31 
Burma Brilain H 26 t:I 19 
British Mahlya Brilain 12 IC- 15 19 
French Induchina I :r;lm.;c 2 1 -1 1 -17 )2 
DUleh Ea'1 1 ndies NClllcr/OIn<h 17 IX 20 2:! 
Philippines PM 75 62 7H 70 
Korea );11);111 91 71 7X 1<5 
Taiwan J.I>.n K7 69 X9 X:' 
TABLE 1 
GcosraPfUcaI Conopos;hon of Inln-A.i." Trade, 1913, 1928, 1938 (£miU;on) 
1913 1928 1938 
West Asia Total West Asia Toral W~Sf Asia Total 
Ind ia ex 96.01 (63) 41.85 (27) 1S2.69 (lOO) 135.93 (581 65.52 (28) 232.92 (100) 63.93 (52) 33.07 (27) 122.12 (lOO) 
im 91.55 (75) 26.61 (U) 12L2S (100) 1\8.36 (59) 64.46 (32) 200.~3 (100) 54.14 (47) 40.91 (36) 114.27 (lOO) 
Southeast ex 56.83 (55) 42.17 (41) 104.05 (100) 142.42 (53) 90.92 (34) 269.« (100) 94-22(51 ) 46.40 (25) 183.37 (lOO) 
Asia im 48.04 (58) 31.66 (38) 82.50 (100) 96.84 (56) 59.13 (34) 173.10 (lOO) 63.90 (55) 35.73 (31) 11S.99 (100) 
China 29.17 (48) 31.41 (52) 60.92 (100) 56.80 (39) 84.23 (58) 144.93 (lOO) 19. 11 (29) 47.35 (72) 66.18 (100) 
im 38.51 (45) 53.38 (62) 86.13 (lOO) 72.45 (41) 104.70 (60) 174.85 (lOO) 26.31 (25) 92.66 (87) 106.97 (100) 
Japan ex 33.05 (45) 36.49 (50) 72.64 (100) 93.03 (41) 120.71 (53) 228.74 (100) 38.18(17) 170.12 (74) 230.75 (lOO) 
im 33.98 (43) 42.03 (53) 78.82 (lOO) 93.23 (36) 138.37 (53) 260.18 (100) 69.92 (32) 125.86 (57) UU2 (100) 
Toral ex 215.06 (SS) 151.92 (39) 390.30 (lOO) 428.18 (49) 361.38 (41) 876.03 (lOO) 215.« 136) 296.94 (49) 602.42 (lOO) 
im 21I-08 157) 153.68 142) 369.701100) 380.88147) 366.66 (45) 808.561100) 214.27138) 295.16153) 558.551100) 
Torallnrra-Asian Trade (I) 167.30 434.96 381.63 
Toral World Trade (2) 4,020.06 6,725.02 4,646.29 
(11112) 4.16% 6.47% 8.21% 
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3. ARAB ENTREPRENEURS IN THE MALAY WORLD IN THE 1930S 
RECESSION 
WilIiam Gervase Clarence-Smith 
(School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London) 
Arab entrepreneurs faced a new challenge in the deep depression of the early 1930s. 
Almost all from Hadhrarnaut in south-central Arabia, they had been on the defensive 
since the 1880 against a rising tide of Chinese competition in the Malay World (modern 
. . 
Indonesia and Malaysia) . Broadly speaking, three types of reaction to the 1930s 
recession can be distinguished. Some individuals and fIrms went bankrupt, others 
weathered the storm with reduced incomes, while yet others took advantage of the 
recession to expand and diversify their enterprises. 
The economic disadvantages of recession are all too clear, but the . corresponding 
opportunities are often forgotten. On the one hand, the purely economic impact is that 
most factors of production become extremely cheap, notably land , labour and 
machinery . Money is the great exception to this rule, recessions favouring those with 
reserves, or at least few debts. On the other hand, economic rents are created for 
political and social reasons. In the case of Arab entrepreneurs in 1930s Southeast Asia, 
one such rent was created by official policies of import substitution under the protection 
of tariffs and quotas, in response to falling export revenues and swelling 
unemployment. Another rent derived from deepening Chinese boycotts of Japanese 
business, as Japanese aggression against China escalated, working to the particular 
benefIt of Arabs and Indians . 
1. The 'Japanese connection' and the commercial and shipping sectors 
As Chinese boycotts intensifIed, Japanese fIrms adopted a two-pronged response. They 
sought to extend their own distribution networks, through agencies or Japanese settlers. 
This was a frustratingly slow process, however, so Japanese fIrms also attempted to sell 
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through non-Chinese distributors. I In 1928, a Japanese newspaper published in Batavia 
called for the elimination of Chinese intermediaries and their replacement by European, 
indigenous and Arab merchant houses . In that year, the allegedly Arab owner of the 
Rasjid Kanaeka Trading Company of Sibolga in Surnatra, went to Japan to enquire 
about importing Japanese products directly .2 Japanese reliance on non-Chinese 
intermediaries i.p.creased greatly after the Mukden incident in 1931. Boycotts were 
especially marked in Singapore, Surnatra and West Java. The cost of Japanese goods 
and freight rates also fell steeply after the devaluation of the Yen. By 1934, some 500 
Indian firms had established agencies or branches in Japan itself, although it is not clear 
whether Arabs followed suit. 3 
What little remained of Hadhrami shipping was temporarily propped up by the 
Japanese. Some Arabs and Chinese operating small oil-fIred coastal vessels in eastern 
Indonesia's copra trade were persuaded in 1935 to give up their activities. In return, 
they received shares in the monopolistic Dutch KPM's newly founded . subsidiary for 
Sulawesi, the Celebes Kustvaart Mij . Other Arabs, however, teamed up with Japanese 
interests to form the rival Molukken Kustvaart Mij., which allowed the Japanese to 
evade new regulations banning foreign flags in the coastwise trade. However, Dutch 
refusal to grant seaworthiness certifIcates to several ships forced the Molukken 
Kustvaart Mij . to sell out to its Dutch rival in 1939.4 
Textiles were at the heart of the Hadhrami-Japanese alliance, for Arab traders 
were even more specialised in selling imported cloth than their Chinese competitors, 
I W.J. Cator, The Economic Position o/the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 
1936),76. 
2 Peter Post, 'The Fonnation of the Pribumi Business Elite in Indonesia, 1930s to 1940s', Bijdragen tot 
de Taal-, Land- en Vollcenkunde, 152 (1996), 4, pp. 87, 93. This individual may have been an Indian 
Muslim. 
3 Peter Post, . Japan and the Integration of the Netherlands East Indies into the World Economy, 1868-
1942', Review a/IndoneSian and Malaysian Affairs, 27 (1993), 1-2,149-50,159 (n. 19). 
4 Howard Dick, The Indonesian Interisland Shipping Industry (ISEAS: Singapore, 1987), 10-11. 
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at least in eastern Indonesia. S 'Indians along with some Arab dealers' became the chief 
distributors of Japanese piece goods in Singapore, a position consolidated by British 
quotas in 1933.6 Arab and ' native ' merchants were the great beneficiaries of Chinese 
boycotts in Java and Sumatra, where Indians were not well represented .7 Official 
attempts to protect Dutch traders from 1934 appear to have had little impact beyond the 
cartel of five direct importers in the main ports . 8 
Arabs mainly sold sarong, haberdashery, and batik, especially the latter. 9 Their 
batik trading was concentrated in the three Javanese towns of Surakarta, Pekalongan 
and Surabaya by the end of the 1930s. IO Business must have been good for some, for 
Sayyid H. bin Husayn b. Shihab, a major Pekaiongan trader in batik and checked cloth, 
endowed a waq{ (charitable trust) for the Madrasah Arabiyah Islam school in the Arab 
quarter of the town in 1935.11 
While some Arabs did well, others were hard hit by the recession. Bankruptcies 
were commonly caused by advancing textiles and other goods to hawkers, usually 
poorer Arabs, who peddled them in villages as the first step on the commercial ladder. 
S Gerrit Kuperus, Het cultuurlandschap van West-Soembawa (J.B. Wolters: Groningen & Batavia, 1936), 
120-2; R.R.F. Habiboe, 'De economische ontwikkeling van de Molukken 1900-1938', in Clemens, A.H.P., 
and Lindblad, J.T., eds., Het belang van de Buitengewesten, economische expansie en koloniale 
staatsvorming in de Buitengewesten van Nederlands-Indie, 1870-1942 (NEHA: Amsterdam, 1989), 270. 
6 W.G. Huff, The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1994), 266-9. 
7 Post, 'Japan and the Integration of the Netherlands East lndies into the World Economy', 149-50; Chantal 
Vuldy, Pekolonga.n: batik et islam dans une ville du nord de Java CElIESS: Paris, 1987), 137; Clifford 
Geertz, Peddlers and Princes: social development and economic change in two Indonesian towns 
(University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1963), 12-13. 
8 Vuldy, Pekalongan, 138. 
9 W.H lngrams, A Report on the Social, Economic and Political Conditions of the Hadhramaut (HMSO: 
London, 1937), 147, 150; lngrams, Arabia and the Isles (John Murray: London, 1942), 172; D. van der 
Meulen and H. von Wissman, Hadramaut; some of its mysteries unveiled (E.J. Brill: Leiden, 1932),44-5. 
10 Handboek voor Cultuur- en Handelsondernemingen in Nederlandsch-Indie (De Bussy: Amsterdam), 
(yearly: hereafter HCHONI), 1940, pp. 1378, 1447, 1455. 
11 Vuldy, Pekalongan, 216-7. 
60 
Many of these hawkers became insolvent in the 1930s crisis, pulling down their 
merchant creditors with them. 12 
Financial difficulties may have prompted the adoption of the joint-stock principle 
for trading companies in Java, which appears to have been a new departure for Arabs. 
The N.V. Handel Mij . Al-BasjarahiJ was registered in October 1933, with a nominal 
capital of 50,000 guilders, its headquarters in Surabaya, and various members of the 
Ba SharahiJ family on the board. 13 The N.V. Handel Mij . Bawazir was created in 1939, 
with a capital of 100,000 guilders, its headquarters in Buitenzorg (Bogor) and various 
members of the Ba Wazir family as directors. 14 Several other Arab joint-stock 
companies s'et up in this decade put down trade as a secondary econorilic purpose. 
The bin Marta' family built up the most successful Hadhrami wholesaling 
business in Indonesia, based in Surabaya. ls However, it was not listed as a joint-stock 
company in the 1940 Handboek. It may have been the mysterious Jibul Fitr company 
that Van der Kroef refers to as the largest of the Arab 'trading associations', which had 
branches throughout the archipelago and in India, and 'rivalled the larger Chinese 
corporations in size and volume of operations before the war.' 16 The N . V . 
HandeJmaatschappij Antara-Asia was the joint-stock trading vehicle of the Bin Marta' 
family after the war, but it is not clear when it was founded. 11 
Many substantial trading houses continued to eschew joint-stock, often being run 
as family partnerships . The Singapore and Malaya Directory showed that Singapore 
was the unrivalled Arab centre on the Malay peninsula . Although the listing of Arab 
12 Ingrams, Report on the ... Hadhramaut, 147. See lsmail b. A. Alatas, ' De Arabieren' in Gent, L.F. van 
(ed.), Gedenkboek voor Nederlandsch-Indie (G. KolfI: Batavia, 1923), 49, for 1920s background. 
13 HCHONI, 1940, 767. 
14 HCHONI, 1940, p. 1013 . 
., van der Meulen and von Wissman, Hadramaut, 101 , 105; D. van der Meulen, Aden to Hadhramaut: 
a journey in South Arabia (John Murray: London, 1947), 155, 163, 215-6. 
16 Justus van der Kroef, ' The Arabs in Indonesia', The Middle East Journal, 7 (1953), 3, 316. 
17 Post, 'The Formation of the Pribumi Business Elite', 105 (n. 28). 
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trading houses in the 1940 Handboek at times confused Arabs with other Muslims, it 
emerges clearly that Surabaya in East Java played the same role in the Dutch East 
Indies, with other centres in Surakarta and Pekalongan. West Java, Sumatra and Borneo 
were less well covered. That said, Arab traders certainly did not disappear from the 
streets of Batavia}S The ' Great East' was patchily covered and of little economic 
weight, but it W!lS the last part of Indonesia where Arabs were still occasionally more 
influential traders than their Chinese rivals, as in Sumba, East Seram, and the Aru and 
Kei islands . 19 
The consolidation of the Hadhrami hold over the horse trade from the Lesser 
Sunda Islands to Java was not the result of alliance with the Japanese. Although the 
dynamism of this trade was impaired by the rise of the internal combustion engine, it 
was still a valuable business . The Great Depression led to a fall in numbers sent to 
Java, but this was only temporary. Horse sales picked up in the late 1930s, stimulated 
by Dutch military purchases for the looming war with Japan. Whereas Arab firms in 
East Java had earlier placed agents in the eastern islands, Mohamat Aldjuffrie & Co. 
had its headquarters on the island of Sumba, with agents in East Java. Sayyid 
Muhammad bin cAbd al-Qadir al-Jufii ran this firm in the late 1930s, together with his 
brother cUmar. 20 
Most produce buying was hard hit by low prices in the 1930s, but Arabs 
continued to purchase rubber, coffee, tea, tobacco, sugar, precious woods, and sago.21 
The Ba Wazir trading company set up in 1939 noted the purchase of commodities as 
11 Susan Abeyasekere, Jakarta. a history (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed.: Singapore, 1989), 140. 
19 HCHONI, 1940, pp. 1311 , 1419, 1474; H. Kistermann, 'De paardenbande1 van Nusa Tenggara, 1815-
1941 " Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, unpublished student paper (1991), 53-4; R. Broersma, ' Koopvaardij 
in de Molukken', Koloniaal Tijdschrijt, 23 (1934), 338-40; R. Broersma, 'Land en volk in Molukken-
Zuid', Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 24 (1935-36), 60-1. 
20 Wi1liam G. Clarence-Srnith, 'Horse Trading: the economic role of Arabs in Nusa Tenggara, c1800 to 
c1940' (forthcoming). 
21 van der Kroet: ' The Arabs in Indonesia', 311-2; Broersma, 'Koopvaardij in de Molukken', 339-41 ; 
Broersma, ' Land en volk in Molukken-Zuid', 71 . 
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its prime objective.22 Exporting abroad was normally done through other communities. 
The al-Saqqaf flrm in Singapore was unusual in the 1930s in itself exporting, with a 
particular emphasis on timber. 23 
2. The expansion of manufacturing 
The traditional ,Hadhrarni involvement in manufacturing for the local market was 
concentrated in workshops making batik cloth on Java. 24 Imported plain cotton cloth 
was printed with the use of wax and imported dyes The 130 Arab batik workshops in 
Java in 1930 were heavily concentrated in Central Java, 88 in the old inland capital of 
Surakarta (Solo), and 25 in the port city of Pekalongan. In contrast, there were none 
at all in Yogyakarta and West Java. Arabs accounted for only 3% of 4,384 batik 
workshops in Java, most units being in Javanese hands . Arab workshops were usually 
larger than those of the Javanese, however, and Hadhrarnis indirectly controlled many 
Javanese enterprises through supplies of inputs and credit.25 
The size of Arab batik workshops tended to grow in the 1930s, even if most did 
not make the transition to factory production. Cheap but high quality Japanese cotton 
cloth saved the business, despite Dutch attempts to restrict such imports, and output 
began to grow strongly again from 1936. However, other government measures to 
'save' Javanese producers from the clutches of 'Foreign Oriental' wholesalers may 
have hampered Arab entrepreneurs.26 
22 HCHONI, 1940, p. 1013. 
23 Singapore and Malayan Directory (yearly: hereafter SMD), 1940, 396. 
24 William G. Clarence-Smith, 'Hadhrami Entrepreneurs in the Malay World, c.1750 to cl940' in Freitag, 
Ulrike, and Clarence-Smith, William G. (eds), Hadhrami traders. scholars and statesmen in the Indian 
Ocean, 1750s-1960s (Brill: Leiden, 1997),312-14; W.H. Ingrams, 'Report on a Tour to Malaya, Java and 
Hyderabad' (al-Mukalla: unpublished typescript, 1940), 123. 
25 Vuldy, Pekalongan, 129-30; Cator, Economic Position of the Chinese, 117-8. 
26 Chantal Vuldy, 'La communaute arabe de Pekalongan', Archipel, 30 (1985), 95-119, 108-9; Vuldy, 
Pekalongon, 130-2. 
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Other textile workshops were stimulated by Dutch ordinances of 1933 and 1935, 
which protected local manufacturers.27 Hadhramis set up workshops in Pekalongan to 
weave a checked cloth (palekat), which had formerly been imported from India, a 
business in which they were more prominent than the Chinese .28 Arabs also built up a 
stake in weaving and sarong production in Bandung, West Java, partly by buying up 
local businesses .and partly by founding new ones. However, Dutch regulations limited 
the size of units, dominated by locally produced handlooms, and Chinese competition 
was strong.29 
Arab workshops turned out many other goods in the 1920s, chiefly in Java but 
also in southern Sumatra. These included foodstuffs , ice, garments, perfume, jewellery, 
furniture, candles, cigarettes, religious texts, and construction materials .30 It is difficult 
to discover what happened to these enterprises in the recession. Arabs held only three 
of the 799 small workshops manufacturing kretek (clove-flavoured) cigarettes in Central 
Java in 1933.31 This seems to reflect a decline compared to the mid-1920s.32 By the 
early 1950s, however, sandals, umbrellas, torch batteries, and matches had been added 
to the list, and Van der Kroef made no mention of a pre-war crisis . Workshops 
typically employed up to twenty women and children in rudimentary conditions in rural 
areas close to Surabaya.33 
27 Post, ' The Fonnation of the Pribumi Business Elite', 99. 
21 Vuldy, Pekalongan, 135. 
29 Christine Dobbin, Asian entreprenerial minorities: conjOint communities in the making of the world 
economy, 1570-1940 (Curzon Press: London, (996), 182-4. 
30 Huub de Jonge, 'Discord and solidarity among the Arabs in the Netherlands East Indies, 190(}'1940', 
Indonesia, 55 (1993), 78; Bambang Purwanto, ' From Dusun to Market: native rubber cultivation in 
southern Sumatra, 1890-1940' (phD Thesis, University of London, 1992), 87. 
31 Cator, Economic Position of the Chinese, 120. Central Java included Surakarta and Yogyakarta. 
32 M.R. Femando and David Bulbeck (eds), Chinese Economic Activity in Netherlands India: selected 
translations from the Dutch (ISEAS: Singapore, 1992), 182. 
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There was also a move towards factory production of consumer goods for the 
internal market. Zayn Ba Jabir ran a particularly large operation in Surabaya in the late 
1930s, producing tin trunks and fibre suitcases.34 Of the ten small factories making 
cement tiles in Batavia in 1940, one belonged to the al-CAydanis (Alaydroes) family and 
another to the Ba Hashwan (Bahasoean) family . 3S Arabs also held two of the 63 large 
and medium concerns manufacturing kretek in Central Java in 1933.36 
The greatest change in the 1930s was the creation of modem textile mills. The 
Bin Sunkar (Soengkar) were Hadhrarni pioneers in combining weaving with batik 
production, with a factory in Surakarta by the end of the decade.37 This initiative was 
probably due to Shaykh cAli bin cAwad bin Sunkar, a wealthy cloth merchant, who 
helped to finance the Ma'had Islam school ofPekalongan, founded in 1942.38 The N.V. 
Textielfabriek en Handel Maatschappij Baswedan was set up in Surabaya in 1938, with 
a partly paid up capital of 300,000 guilders and headed by Ibrahim Ba Suwaydan 
(Brahim Baswedan).39 
Even more significant was the textile empire created by the Bin Marta' (Martak) 
family .40 The first Bin Marta' weaving plant was set up in Surabaya in 1934, on the 
advice of a Javanese engineer working as government industrial adviser. A year later, 
the brothers Faraj and Ahmad bin Sacid bin cAwad bin Marta' set up a second and 
larger weaving mill at Kesono, near Mojokerto in eastern Java. This factory was 
managed by a Dutchman and had a thousand looms , of which 600 were Suzuki 
mechanical looms made in Japan. At the end of the 1930s, the family firm of Alsaid bin 
34 Ingrams, ' Report on a tow', 11 3. 
3S HCHONI, 1940, p, 1280. 
36 Cator, Economic Position of the Chinese, p. 120. 
37 Ingrams, ' Report on a Tow', 123, 
38 Vuldy, Pekalongan, 217. 
39 HCHONI, 1940, p. 1011. 
40 Ingrams, . Report on a Tour', 123; van der Meulen, Aden /0 Hadhramaut, 215 . 
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Awad Martak had become the largest non-European textile concern on Java.4! It 
employed nearly 2,000 workers in its Surabaya plant alone .42 
The Bin Marta' position in eastern Java was consolidated under the Japanese 
occupation. The Textile Control Board, created in 1942 to monopolise the purchase, 
storage and sale of yam, was dominated by the firm of Alsaid bin Awad Martak. 43 In 
the post-war yea,rs, Chinese and Arabs in eastern Java were accused of maintaining 
imports of Japanese cotton yam exclusively for their weaving factories. 44 
Processing raw materials for export, typical of industry in the sparsely populated 
Outer Islands and Malaya, was more vulnerable to world recession. The Handel-
Industrie- en' Cultuur Maatschappij S. Alwi Assegaf in Palembang, South Sumatra, was 
set up as a joint-stock company in 1928, with the main purpose of running the Prinses 
Juliana steam-driven sawmill and rice mill. The company was still active at the end of 
the 1930s, under the management of Sayyid cAlawi bin Shaykh al-SaqqM, probably 
because it was largely oriented towards the internal market.4s 
3. Real estate, banking, and the press 
Real estate and construction were an established Arab speciality, and the vicious 
downward spiral in prices in the 1930s reduced rental incomes. While no bankruptcies 
were recorded, the al-KM family had to manage with considerably lower returns from 
its extensive property portfolio in Singapore and Java. The wealthy Salim bin JaCfar bin 
nlib was reported in 1939 to be 'in trouble with regard to his houses in Surabaya, the 
41 Post, 'The Fonnation of the Pribumi Business Elite', 104-5 (n. 28). 
42 Ingrams, . Report on a Tour', 113. 
43 Post, 'The Fonnation of the Pribumi Business Elite', 104-5 (n. 28) . 
.. ClifIord Geertz, Peddlers and Princes: social development and economic change in two Indonesian 
towns (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1963), 114. 
4S HCHONI, 1940, 769-70. 
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rents of which had diminished because of the world economic crisis . ,46 In al-Hurayda, 
family town of the al-CAttas family, a school had to close because revenues from its 
property endowment in Java had fallen.47 
Nonetheless, the Hadhrami stake in urban property remained impressive in the 
1930s, and firms may have benefited from bargain prices. Sayyid 'Umar bin Shaykh 
ai-KM owned ' ,the great Europe Hotel in Singapore, which makes an impression 
magnificently American. ,48 The family firm in Singapore in 1940 styled itself rather 
curiously as 'Alkaff and Co., House and Landowners and Estate Agents (Real) .' Apart 
from the two partners, the fum employed fifteen senior staff in its Singapore office, all 
seemingly Arabs. It had a branch in Batavia and an agency in Aden.49 The ai-KM 
family trust had investments estimated at £25 million in Singapore by the 1950s, 
'though today the family is grown so large that the income is terribly subdivided.·50 
The Geylang Serai district in Singapore, where the al-SaqqM family owned the 
Perseverance estate, was redeveloped for housing in the 1930s, one of its streets 
receiving the name of Jalan Alsagoff in 1932. ~1 
The 1930s may have seen an expansion of Arab real estate holding in the Straits 
Settlements. Arabs, together with Jews, were in 1931 'the largest owners of house 
property' in Singapore.~2 Property ensured that Arabs remained the wealthiest 
community per head in the town in the latter part of the decade, with thirteen principal 
families holding assets valued at £2 .5 million. Whole streets were reputedly owned by 
46 van der Meulen,Aden to Hadhramaut, 159,219-20. 
47 Freya Stark, A Winter in Arabia (London: John Murray, 3d ed .. 1945), p. 60. 
48 van der Meulen and von Wissman, Hadramaut, 137. 
49 SMD, 1940,395. 
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Hadhramis, in both Singapore and Penang.53 In the late 19405, over a third of Kampong 
Glam was owned by Arabs.54 Indeed, there was growing resentment directed at Arabs 
for allegedly pushing up land prices and crowding Malays out of Singapore. 55 
The Hadhrami stake in urban property in Java was also impressive. In 1940, 
there were eight Arab dominated joint-stock companies, whose main purpose was urban 
construction and the management of real estate portfolios, set up between 1932 and 
1938. Unlike trading firms, they were evenly divided between Batavia and Surabaya, 
with three in each city, plus one in Bandung and one in Surakarta. They belonged to 
some of the most famous Arab families in the island, the al-KM, al-CAydarUs, al-Hibshi, 
Bin Marta' : Ba Suwaydan, Bin Sunkar, and Bin Mutlaq. 56 
Agriculture was of far less significance to Arabs, partly because the Dutch 
restricted 'Foreign Oriental' access to land. 57 A group of Arabs in Jambi, South 
Surnatra, even petitioned officials for 'native' status in the early 1930s, to cease paying 
rent to local people. 58 The handful of Arabs who owned particuliere landerijen around 
Batavia, with quasi-feudal rights over local inhabitants, were gradually selling their 
lands well before the crisis struck.59 However, there were Hadhrami tea estates in West 
Java in the 1930s, possibly because tea had become the 'national beverage' of 
Hadhramaut. 60 The al-Saqqaf were the only Arabs to attempt to take advantage of more 
favourable British land policies in Malaya. Their 19,000 acre Pulau Bulang estate was 
S3 Ingrams, Report on the ... Hadhramaut, 150. 
S4 lA.E. Morley, :The Arabs and the Eastern Trade', Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic 
Society, 22 (1949),1 , 170. 
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planted with 2,500 acres of rubber in the late 1930s.61 The 1934 International Rubber 
Agreement created a potential economic rent for estates at the expense of Malay 
smallholders, but it is far from clear whether the al-Saqqaf made any profits from this 
venture. 
Great losses were incurred by some of the numerous and active Arab 
moneylenders, who side-stepped Koranic prohibitions on usury by fictitiou's sales and 
the renting of money. Collateral for loans was poor, as 'Foreign Orientals' could not 
obtain land from 'Natives' under Dutch law. Nonetheless, the famous Arab community 
of moneylenders in Tegal, Central Java, appear to have retained much of their wealth 
in the 1930;.62 Ingrams said of Arab moneylenders on Java that 'their wings have 
recently been clipped', suggesting that losses were moderate. 63 Much worse was to 
come after 1940, when rocketing inflation, general insecurity and harsh nationalist 
pressures hit Arab moneylenders very hard .64 
A major new development for Hadhramis was the growth of newspapers in the 
British Straits Settlements. The fact that the Malay language there was still mainly 
printed in Arabic script provided Arabs with an economic niche. In the 1930s, 'hard-
headed Arab press barons' emerged in Singapore and Penang, employing mainly Malay 
journalists. The foundation of the Warta Malaya press group in 1930 by the al-Saqqaf 
family of Singapore was a milestone . Sayyid CAlawi bin CUmar aI-Bar was another 
Singapore 'press baron', while Sayyid Shaykb bin Ahrnad al-Hadi owned the Jelutong 
Press in Penang, which published two influential papers. Indeed, there was Malay 
resentment by the end of the decade at the degree of Hadhrarni flllancial control over 
the press, despite the pro-Malay political stance of these newspapers.65 
61 SMD, 1940, 930. 
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The Arab position in the press of the Dutch East Indies was much weaker. 
Restrictions on publishing were greater, and Latin script was the norm for printing local 
languages. The vernacular papers in Latin script with the highest circulation were in 
Chinese hands .66 Nonetheless, there were many titles put out by Hadhramis, in a 
mixture of Arabic, Malay in Arabic characters, and Malay in Latin letters . These 
papers had a s~ll circulation, however, and no ' press barons' emerged. 67 Indeed, the 
Surabaya printing and publishing firm of Alwedah, set up by Shaykh Muhammad bin 
<Abdallab al-<Amudi of Ambon and Surabaya, was bankrupt by 1933.68 
4. The social origins of Hadhrami entrepreneurs 
The upheavals of the 1930s appear to have intensified a process which was already well 
under way, the challenge to the position of a Sayyid group, which claimed direct 
descent from the Prophet Muhammad. While not necessarily recognised as socially 
superior in Hadhramaut itself, they had undoubtedly become dominant in the Malay 
World by virtue of their role in the early waves of immigration from the middle of the 
eighteenth century. Increasing resentment of Sayyid pretensions went hand in hand with 
the growing wealth of other social strata. 69 
The 1930s recession certainly did not eliminate the economic basis of Sayyid 
prominence. Some of the great families emerged apparently unscathed. The al-KM and 
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the al-SaqqM were perhaps the most notable Sayyid dynasties of Singapore to survive 
the recession in style . These two families were also well represented in the Dutch 
possessions, where the al-Hibshi, al-CAydarus, Ba Aqil and Bin Shihab were well 
ensconced. Some Sayyid families clearly did more than survive, notably those involved 
in Malaya's newspapers, and the al-Jufri in Indonesia's horse trade . 
Sayyid families nonetheless appear to have been the worst affected by difficulties 
in moneylending and real estate, although this hypothesis requires much more detailed 
research. Two formerly influential families, the al-Junayd of Singapore and the al-
CAMs of Batavia, did not appear in companies listed in the Handboek and the Directory 
for 1940, aithough some al-Junayd worked for the ai-KM in Singapore and some al-
CAMs were bureaucrats in the Malay states . More striking was the lack of evidence of 
Sayyid entrepreneurs in new businesses. 
In contrast, there was an unmistakable surge of activity by the non-Sayyid, 
notably in manufacturing on Java. The rising entrepreneurs of the 19305 came from a 
variety of non-Sayyid origins. The Bin Talib of Singapore and Surabaya, and the Bin 
Mutlaq of Surabaya were members of the great Kathiri tribe, from which one of the 
Sultans of Hadhramaut was drawn.10 They were thus Qabill, bearing arms and 
considering themselves superior to the Sayyid group in Hadhramaut. 71 The Ba Wazir, 
prominent in East Africa, were of the Shaykh social stratum, that is 'indigenous' 
religious specialists who contested Sayyid claims to supremacy. The Bin Sunkar, from 
Haynin, and the Ba Sharahil were of the ' bourgeois' fraction of the Maskin, and the 
latter family was also well represented in East Africa .n The exact social background 
70 L.W.C. van den Berg, Le Hadramout et les colonies arabes dans I'archipel indien (lmprimerie du 
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and Clarence-Smith, William G. (eds), Hadhrami Traders. Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean. 
1750s-1960s (Brill: Leiden, 1997), 147-56. 
n van den Berg, Le Hadramout et les colonies arabes, 41 , 49-52; Le Guennec-Coppens, Fran~ise (1997), 
'Changing Patterns ofHadhrami Migration and Social Integration in East Africa', in Freitag, Ulrike, and 
Clarence-Smith, WilIiam G. (eds), Hadhrami Traders. Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean. 
1750$-1960$ (Brill : Leiden, 1997), 164. 
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of the Ba Suwaydan, from Shibam, and the Bin Marta', from Haynin, is unclear, but 
they were not Sayyid.73 Indeed, <Abd al-Ralunan Ba Suwaydan was probably the most 
prominent anti-Sayyid Arab journalist and political activist in Java in the 1930s.'4 These 
families were not recent arrivals in the Malay World, but they achieved a new 
economic prominence in the 1930s. 
Conclusion 
While there were reports of distress among the Hadhrami community of the Malay 
World during the Great Depression of the 1930s, it is surprising how little hard 
evidence of bankruptcy emerges . This may reflect the pride of an immigrant 
community, unwilling to admit to failure. It is more likely, however, that it reflects an 
ability, common to all great entrepreneurial diasporas, to adapt quickly and effectively 
to recession. Indeed, some Hadhramis seized the opportunities that the 1930s brought 
to break new ground in the economic development of Southeast Asia. 
73 van der Meulen and von Wissman, Hadramaut, 101, 105, 116; van der MeuJeD, Aden to Hadhramaut, 
155, 160-4, 215·6. 
74 Hamid AJgadri, Dutch Policy Against Islam and Indonesians of Arab Descent in Indonesia (Pustaka 
LP3ES: Jakarta, 1994), 112·6, 129. 
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4. THE 'LONG DEPRESSION' AND THE GROWTH OF SMALL-SCALE 
INDUSTRIES IN GHANA, C.1870 - MID 1980S 
Rajiv Ball (Arthur Andersen: 1997 LSE PhD) 
Since the early 1970s there has been ' an explosion in small-scale industrial activity in 
Ghana' .1 If a small-scale industry is defined as employing fewer than 30 workers, then 
it can be estimated that the number engaged full-time in Ghana's small industry sector 
increased from about 337,000 in 1970 to 533,000 in 1984.2 Today, Ghana has one of 
Africa's largest and most sophisticated small industry sectors. Ghanaian small industrial 
finns are involved in food-processing, wood-working, weaving, tailoring, cement block 
production, cosmetics manufacture, machine-building and vehicle repair. 3 Most operate 
in simple buildings which have wooden walls and corrugated iron roofs. Almost all are 
in the private sector and many are in the 'informal' economy: 65 per cent of the 1,365 
small flnns surveyed by Nii Sowa et al. in 1991 were unregistered.4 
This paper explores conventional explanations for Ghana's small industry 
'explosion' and demonstrates how an alternative approach helps to understand this 
phenomenon. The first section of the paper reviews the established literature on 
Ghanaian small industry growth and suggests how this is deficient. The second section 
contends that Ghana's small industry 'explosion' has been facilitated by a prior process 
1 Ionathan Dawson, ' Development of Small-scale Industry in Ghana - A Case Study of Kumasi', in Henk 
Thomas, Francisco Uribe-Echevarria and Henry Romijn (eds.), Small-Scale Production. Strategies for 
Industrial Restructuring (Intermediate Technology Publications: London, 1991), 173 . 
2 Appendix I. 
3 W.H. Thomi and P.W.K. Yankson, Small Scale Industries and Decentralization in Ghana. A Preliminary 
Report on Small Scale Industries in Small and Medium Sized Towns in Ghana (Department of Geography, 
University of Ghana: Legon, 1985), table 8, 33. 
4 Nii K. Sowa, A. Baah-Nuakoh, K.A. Tutu and B. Osei, Small Enterprises and Adjustment. The Impoct 
of Ghana's Economic Recovery Programme on Small Industrial Enterprises (Overseas Development 
Institute: London, 1992), 25. 
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of skill acquisition through apprenticeships, formal education, work in large-scale 
industries and learning-by-observation. The concluding section examines some of the 
wider implications of this rmding. 
1. Conventional Explanations for Small Industry Growth 
The literature on small industries in the Third World generally locates the dynamics of 
small flrm formation in two areas: the supply of factors of production necessary for 
small flrm creation (such as capital and labour) and the demand for small flrm 
products.s The Ghanaian small flrm literature has followed these lines. 
' Supply Side' Ninsin contends that the growth of small industry in Ghana can 
be explained by the increase in the supply of labour to the small industry sector.6 
According to Ninsin, this increase has been a result of the failure of the government 
and large-scale private businesses - what Ninsin terms the 'formal sector' - to provide 
jobs for the expanding workforce. Thus, Ninsin asserts that small-scale industries 
consist of 'that array of precarious economic activities which have become the haven 
of people seeking desperately to eke out a living because they are unable to secure wage 
or salaried employment in the formal capitalist sector' .7 
Ninsin's reasoning is appealing. Between c.1970 and the mid 1980s, the 
Ghanaian economy experienced a 'long depression' . Recorded per capita income fell 
30 per cent between 1970 and 1982.8 By the 1980s, formal sector wages had become 
S Waiter Elkan, ' Policy for Small-Scale Industry: a Critique', Journal of International Development, I , 2 
(1989),231-60. Carl Liedholm, ' Small Scale Industries in Africa: Dynamic Issues and the Role of Policy', 
in Frances Stewart, Sanjaya Lall, Samuel Wangwe (eds.), Alternative Development Strategies in Sub 
Saharan Africa (MacmiUan: London, 1992), 185-212. 
6 Kwame A. Ninsin, The Informal Sector in Ghana's Political Economy (Freedom Publications: Acera, 
1991),58. 
7 Ninsin, Informal Sector, 2. 
I World Bank, Ghana: Policies and Program for Adjustment (Washington D.C., 1984), xvi, cited in 
Douglas Rimmer, Staying Poor. Ghana's Political &onomy. 1950-1990 (pergamon Press: Oxford, 1992), 
133. 
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inadequate to support a family. According to one estimate, the academic salaries of 
senior members of the University of Ghana covered only one-third of their total 
monthly expenditures in 1985.9 Thus, it is tempting to conclude that increasing numbers 
have sought to work in small-scale industries just to survive. However, although 
increasing poverty may have forced workers to 'eke out a living' through small-scale 
industrial activities, this does not constitute a full explanation. If small industry growth 
is a function of poverty alone, then poor African countries in general would have 
comparatively big small industry sectors. This has not been the case. In 1983, for 
instance, Black Africa's per capita income was well below Ghana's,lO yet, with the 
exception of Nigeria, small industry sectors comparable in size to Ghana's have not 
been known to exist anywhere else in Africa. 
'Demand Side' While Ninsin's approach centres on the 'supply side' of small firm 
creation, Dawson focuses on the 'demand side' of the equation. 11 During the 'long 
depression', Ghana experienced an acute shortage of foreign exchange. This foreign 
exchange crisis resulted in the contraction of imported manufactures, while large-scale 
industries collapsed because they depended on imported inputs. 12 Small-scale industries, 
by contrast, have been more reliant on locally-available inputs. Hence, according to 
Dawson, small industries expanded into the 'economic vacuum' 13 created by the decline 
in imported manufactures and the disintegration of the large-scale industrial sector. 
Dawson substantiates this reasoning with reference to the small-scale vehicle repair 
9 Kodwo Ewusi, Structural Adjustment and Stabilizalion Policies in Developing Countries. A Case Study 
ofGhana's Experience in 1983-86 (Gbana Publisbing Corporation: Tema, 1987), table 29, 61 . 
10 World Bank, World Development Report, 1985 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1985), table I, 174-
75. 
11 Jonathan Dawson, 'The Wider Context: the Importance of the Macroeconomic Environment for Small 
Enterprise Development', Small Enterprise Development, 1,3 (1990), 39-46. 
12 Rimmer, Staying Poor, cbs 5-7. 
13 Dawson, 'Wider Context', 44. 
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industry which boomed in the 19705 as imported vehicle spares became scarce. 14 At the 
same time, Guinness stopped transporting its beer bottles in imported cardboard 
packaging and switched to wooden crates produced by local small-scale carpenters. 15 
It is difficult to argue that small-scale industries gained no benefit at all from the 
foreign exchange crisis of the 'long depression'. However, this cannot constitute a 
complete explan;ltion for the growth of small industry either. A major problem with 
Dawson's explanation is its presumption that the collapse of large-scale industrial 
production increased the demand for small industry products automatically. This is an 
untested, and possibly false, assumption because during these years of large industry 
collapse, per capita income was also decreasing. This would suggest that the aggregate 
market for industrial products was shrinking. Therefore, if small-scale industries 
managed to carve out an increasing share of a contracting market for industrial 
products, then there may well have been other factors at work besides the fall in 
competition from large-scale industrial producers . 
Hypothesis One underlying problem with both the Ninsin and Dawson analyses is their 
failure to consider adequately the role of the entrepreneur in small firm creation. Firms 
are established only after entrepreneurs have accumulated the necessary skills, capital 
and technology for their creation. Neither Ninsin nor Dawson addresses this issue. It 
is myopic to assume that small firms appear on the industrial landscape simply when 
poverty increases or competition from manufactured imports diminishes . Instead, it is 
probable that there is a broader story of skills, capital and technology accumulation to 
be told. 
Thus, it is hypothesised that the growth of Ghana's small industry sector has 
been facilitated by a long-term accumulation of skills, capital and technology . It is 
hypothesised that this accumulation process was facilitated by the particular nature of 
14 Dawson, 'Development of Small-scale Industry', 185. 
IS lonathan Dawson, ' Small-Scale Adjustment', West Africa, 28 December 1988, 2439. 
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Ghana's economic development up to the 1970s and the subsequent 'long depression' . 
In the next section of the paper, this hypothesis is tested with particular reference to 
skills acquisition in the small-scale metal-working sector in Kumasi. Small-scale metal-
working has been chosen for study because it epitomises some of the real successes of 
small industry in Ghana: small-scale metal-workers now produce a wide range of 
consumer goods and, unlike other industries in Ghana, they also manufacture capital 
goods for food-processing, cement block-making and electric welding. Since the late 
1980s, almost all African countries have tried to promote small-scale industries and, 
in this respect, Ghana's small-scale metal industries are an example to the continent. 
3. Skills Accumulation and the Growth of Small-scale Metal-Working in Kumasi 
From Correlation to Causation There is circumstantial evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the growth of small-scale metal-working has been facilitated by a long-
term accumulation of skills. The existing literature suggests at least three' agents of 
skill transfer,16 - apprenticeships, formal education and work in large-scale enterprises 
- which have contributed to the process of industrial skills accumulation. For instance, 
the majority of the 209 Accra and Kumasi small-scale metal- and wood-workers 
surveyed by Anheier and Seibel in 1986 had been trained as apprenticesY From a 
survey of 500 small-scale metal-workers in Kumasi in 1988, Dawson found that 77 per 
cent of entrepreneurs had received some formal school education,18 a figure higher than 
that for the Ghanaian population as a whole. Dawson also found that 22 per cent of 
entrepreneurs previously had worked in a large-scale company, 19 again, a figure higher 
16 Tidiane Boye, Alien Fenichel and Maimire Mennasemay, 'Skill Transfer and African Development: a 
Conceptual Research Note', Journal of Modern African Studies, 26, 4 (1988), 686. 
17 Helmut Anheier and Hans Dieter Seibel, Small-Scale Industries and Economic Development in Ghana: 
Business Behaviour and Strategies in Informal Sector Economics (Verlag Breitenbach: Saarbriicken, 
1987), table 5.9, 52. 
18 Dawson, ' Development of Small-scale Industry', 180. 
19 Dawson, ' Development of Small-scale Industry', 180. 
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than that for the Ghanaian population overall. Other surveys of Ghana's small-scale 
industrial sector have painted a similar picture.2° 
The problem with these data is that they make only a circumstantial case for the 
importance of long-term skills accumulation in the process of small industry growth. 
The surveys show a co"elation between formal school education and small-scale 
industrial entrepreneurship, but do not prove causation: on the one hand, foimal school 
education may have had no importance in developing small-scale industrial 
entrepreneurship; on the other hand, it may have been crucial. One reason why the 
issue of causation has been examined inadequately is the methodology used in the 
surveys so far . Anheier and Seibel, Dawson, as well as others, have relied on 
questionnaires with either closed or multiple-choice answers. This methodology has the 
advantage of enabling many interviews to be conducted, and much factual information 
to be collected, in a comparatively short space of time. However the methodology is 
not well-suited to the study of causal relationships, because such relationships cannot 
be boxed into closed or multiple choice answers . For this purpose, a more open-ended, 
interactive type of interview is suitable. 
Survey Methodology With this in mind, I conducted twenty open-ended interviews with 
small-scale metal-working industrialists in March 1996 (henceforth referred to as the 
Kumasi Survey) . The interviews were tape-recorded and lasted about forty minutes on 
average. The twenty respondents were selected from the Suame Magazine, a vast 
industrial 'shanty town' housing about 40,000 small-scale industrial workers21 and 
located to the north of Kumasi, Ghana' s second largest city . The respondents were not 
selected at random, but were chosen so that the overall sample included a wide variety 
20 Addie van Ommering and Kees van der Ree, . Small-Scale Industries in Ghana. Past, Present and 
Possible Role in Economic Growth and Spread ofDevelopmen~, University of Amsterdam, Department 
of Human Geography, MA Thesis, 1983, table 5.24, 104. William F. Steel and Leila M. Webster, Small 
Enterprises Under Adjustment in Ghana (World Bank: Washington D.e., 1991), 11-2. 
21 Dawson, 'Development of Small-scale Industry', 173. 
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of firms . Thus, the smallest flrm had two workers, while the largest had twenty-six. 
The oldest firm had been established in 1962, the youngest in 1994. There were 
manufacturers of metal consumer goods (such as watering cans and gates) as well as 
exhaust builders, engine reborers, brake pad reliners, nut and bolt producers, donkey 
cart manufacturers and machine-builders. All the respondents worked full-time, and 
depended on small industry work for a living. 
General and Technical Education While other surveys have demonstrated that small-
scale metal-workers typically have received more formal education than average 
Ghanaians, the data from the Kumasi survey suggest that this formal education has 
assisted entrepreneurs in small firm creation. 
In the Kumasi Survey, 19 metal-workers had attended primary school and one 
had remained at school until he was 15 years old . When asked if school had helped 
them to establish a firm, most felt that it had. One metal-worker suggested that 
attending secondary school had enhanced his ability to perform calculations.22 Another 
argued that school had taught him how to take measurements, a skill which he required 
to manufacture exhausts and compressed gas cylinders.23 An exhaust manufacturer 
reasoned that the art and craft courses which he had attended at school had taught him 
how to mould objects, which increased his ability to design car exhausts . Speaking 
through a translator, this respondent explained: 
... when he was in school, he was very interested in things, moulding things, art and 
craft. So he thinks that that helped him to learn the exhaust - the making of exhaust 
- very quickly at the fust attempt. Because he has some apprentices who have spent 
nearly 10 years and they aren' t as good as he was when he spent the 5 years .24 
Likewise, a master electrical engineer felt that those with a school education had more 
22 Metal 2. 
2l Metal 9. 
24 Metal 17. 
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, sense' and an ability to learn the trade faster. 2!i Hence, he himself tried to avoid taking 
on apprentices who were not 'educated'. 26 
To be sure, not all those interviewed found that a formal education had been 
useful. One respondent remembered with affection that history had been his ' special 
subject' at school, but admitted that it had not helped him much in his work as a 
producer of nut$ and bolts.27 In all, five metal-workers felt that attending school had 
been of no benefit to them whatsoever. 28 
With regard to technical school, the five metal-workers who had attended such 
institutions were quick to list a clutch of relevant skills which they had acquired there. 
These included bench fitting, electric welding, technical drawing and metal 
fabrication. 29 Thus, the Kumasi Survey suggests that, for the metal-workers, there is 
a strong causal relationship between attending technical school and subsequent small-
scale industrial activity. The causal relationship between general education and small 
industry activity is weaker, but existent nonetheless. 
Work Experience in Large-scale Industry A second factor which has increased the 
stock of industrial entrepreneurs has been the transfer of skilled labour from large-scale 
to small-scale industries. 
Among the metal-workers, five had worked in large Ghanaian industrial firms 
prior to establishing their own enterprise.3O All of them had found this experience 
useful. For instance, one manufacturer of agricultural machinery felt that his first job 
25 Metal 20. 
26 Metal 20. 
27 Metal 7. 
21 Metal 7, 11, 13, 15 and 18. 
29 Metal 2, 5, 6, 10 and 14. 
JO Metal 1, 3, 6, 10 and 14. 
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in a large engineering company had provided him with a comprehensive introduction 
to machine-building. As he narrated: 
... they taught me the mechanism of a machine. So when I came to fabricating, it let 
me know how to assemble machines, or dismantle it and assemble it again . . . at that 
time, I was a pump mechanist. Then someone bought the pump for servicing, we 
assembled it and disassembled it and fixed it back. So, it let me know how to 
disassemble a thing and fix it back .31 
Another respondent, who had never been to school, first acquired machine skills (and, 
in particular, lathe-turning) over a period of seven years while working for Pan African 
Engineering~ a large Lebanese engineering firm. 32 
An interesting phenomenon, which previous surveys have failed to highlight, but 
which the Kumasi Survey reveals clearly, is the importance of work in large-scale 
industries abroad. Emigration was a typical response to the 'long depression': at one 
time, there were more Ghanaian-trained doctors in West Germany than in Ghana, while 
Nigerian universities had more Ghanaian lecturers than Ghanaian higher education 
institutions themselves. 33 Among the metal-workers, two respondents had acquired 
industrial skills while working for a large-scale industry abroad. One had worked for 
Addis Engineering, a large manufacturing firm in Nigeria. He explained that , during 
his time there, he had practised using a centre lathe to produce pulleys for electric 
motors . This was a skill which he was using today to produce nuts and bolts for motor 
vehicles and agricultural machinery. 34 Another small industrialist had worked as a 
)1 Metal!. 
32 Metal 3. 
)) Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan, 'Disengagement from the State in Africa: Reflections on the 
Experience of Ghana and Guinea', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 29, 1 (1987), 118. 
34 Metal 6. 
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welder for Brystyle Industries, a large Nigerian battery and light bulb manufacturer, 
and still worked as a welder, producing water coolers, water tanks and iron gates.35 
Apprenticeship The apprenticeship system has been a common means by which 
industrial skills have been acquired. In a typical apprenticeship, the apprentice works 
for a 'master' w.hile learning the trade. In return for his labour, the apprentice receives 
a small ' chop wage' , as well as occasional tips from customers . The duration of the 
apprenticeship varies according to the time required to master the trade. 
Apprenticeships in soap-making may last up to six months, while those in metal-
working c~ be more than three years 10ng.36 
In the Kumasi Survey, only three metal-workers had not undertaken an 
apprenticeship before starting their finn . For the other 17 metal-workers , 
apprenticeships were crucial in developing small industry skills . A small-scale exhaust 
manufacturer is a case in point: with no formal school education at alt and only the 
experience of work on his family's cocoa farm, this exhaust builder completed a two 
year apprenticeship and then established his own firm immediately thereafter. 37 Given 
that this respondent had no previous formal education or business experience, it is 
difficult to conceive that he would have been able to start his own exhaust-building 
workshop had he not completed an apprenticeship. 
In certain instances, an apprenticeship added to industrial experience already 
accumulated elsewhere. The agricultural machinery manufacturer, who first had learnt 
to assemble and disassemble machines in a large firm, completed an apprenticeship with 
a 'master' machine builder afterwards. During this time, customers who had problems 
with their machines would often ask for advice and '1 correct [sic] the problem and let 
3S Metal 14. 
36 Thorni and Yankson, Small Scale Industries, 34. 
37 Metal 8. 
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me get some experience' .38 In other cases, skills acquired during an apprenticeship were 
modified and then deployed to other fields. Thus, one metal-worker who had learnt 
burglar bar production during his apprenticeship, later realised that the burglar bar 
business was not particularly lucrative and used his skills to manufacture rice mills and 
nut crackers instead. 39 Similarly, a metal-worker who had undertaken a three year 
apprenticeship in hoe manufacturing, later adapted his skills to manufacture nuts and 
OOlts .4O An industrialist who had completed a three year apprenticeship in auto-electrics, 
went on to manufacture battery-chargers, transformers and welding machines .41 
Learning-biObservation A phenomenon which the Kumasi Survey reveals quite 
clearly, but which previous surveys have not stressed, is learning-by-observation. Many 
respondents in the Kumasi Survey claimed to have acquired their industrial skills by 
observing other small industrialists at work, typically, competitors, friends or relatives. 
Many metal-workers acknowledged that they had learnt skills from their 
competitors. For example, one manufacturer of agricultural machinery remarked: 
. .. not everyone know[s] everything. We teach one another. So if I'm making a 
machine, and I make mistake and someone come and tell me, please, this you have 
made a mistake then I agree. I let him teach me what to do.42 
Another respondent, when asked if he learnt anything from others in the Suame 
Magazine, replied, ' As for that actually, we learn from each other. We learn from each 
other ... As for competition, there is no competition. If you use some technology, you 
go to your friend and you learn from him' .43 
38 Metal!. 
39 Metal 4. 
40 Metal 7. 
4\ Metal 20. 
42 Metal!. 
43 Metal 7. 
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Even if the metal-workers were sometimes slow to concede that they had 
acquired skills from others, most were quick to claim to have imparted skills to their 
peers. Typical of this was one respondent who recounted: 
Some people' .. . do not learn the trade very well, so sometimes they have problems 
and they come over to me for advice, and I teach them, I advise them on what they 
should do . How to make their goods quality ... last year, I had a friend up here, and 
he didn't know how to do it very well, so ... he often came to me for advice and I 
gave him. I taught him almost everything I know. And now he's doing very well. 44 
While some learnt from other small industrialists, two of the respondents 
acquired their industrial skills by observing their fathers at work. One welder was 
introduced to his trade by watching his father, who was also an electric welder, at work 
after schoo1.4s Likewise, a cement-block machine-builder learnt to weld by observing 
his father who used to be a welder in a large construction company. 40 
3. Concluding Remarks 
Conventional explanations cannot account fully for the ' explosion' of small-scale 
industry in Ghana since the 1970s. Behind the growth of the small-scale industries in 
the Kumasi Survey, there is at least a broader story of skills acquisition. As one 
respondent who had attended an University technical school, completed an 
apprenticeship in the Suame Magazine, and worked in a large brewery in Nigeria 
before starting his small machine-building firm attested: 
... 1 can say that all these fabrications and other[s] I'm doing are as the result of the 
accumulated working experience: from the University, when I lived here in the 
44 Metal 9. 
4S MetalS. 
46 Metal 13. 
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Magazine, and in Nigeria. That is ... all these places there were fabrication working 
places.47 
Given the small size of the sample in the Kumasi Survey, it is difficult to know 
how far this finding may be generalised. The survey evidence does not permit any 
robust conclusions on the importance of skills acquisition in the growth of small-scale 
industries in ge~ral. Further research may clarify this issue. Admittedly, iris probable 
that metal-working requires a greater accumulation of industrial skills than, for 
instance, food-processing. Also, it is likely that learning-by-observation has been 
comparatively easy in the vast industrial 'shanty town' of Suame than, for example, in 
a remote village with few small-scale industries. Nevertheless, it is still highly probable 
that all entrepreneurs do require some industrial skills, and any explanation of the 
growth of small-scale industries must take this into account. 
If the findings of this survey are confirmed by other studies, then there would 
be two main implications. First, it would lend support to new' endogenous' growth 
theories which stress the importance of human capital formation in the process of 
economic growth.48 As Crafts argues, ' endogenous' models of growth accounting 
'stress the role of human capital and would imply that traditional growth accounting 
will give incorrect estimates of human capital's contribution to growth' .49 The results 
of this study appear to confirm the importance of human capital formation in small 
industrial firm creation and hence economic growth. 
Second, the battered reputation of the Ghanaian state's management of the 
economySO would have to be reassessed. This is because, wittingly or unwittingly, the 
47 Metal 10. 
48 Paul M Romer, 'The Origins of Endogenous Growth', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, 1 (1994), 
20-1. Norman Gemmell, ' Evaluating the Impacts of Human Capital Stocks and Accumulation on 
Economic Growth: Some New Evidence', Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 58, I (1996), 24-5. 
49 N.F.R. Crafts, ' Human Capital and Productivity in Advanced Economies', in John A. James and Mark 
Thomas (eds.), Capitalism in Context. Essays on Economic Development and Cultural Change in Honour 
ofRM Hartwell (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1994), 190. 
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Ghanaian state has engineered a skills 'explosion' since the 1960s. For instance, while 
only 13 per cent of the eligible age group was in secondary school in 1965, by 1986 
this figure had risen to 35 per cent.51 In 1986, Ghana's secondary school enrolment rate 
was higher than that of Zambia, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire and Botswana.52 By the 199Os, 
the Ghanaian state had played a major part in establishing an extensive network of 
technical education institutions, some of which were being ' exported' to other African 
countries.53 Finally, it was the state which created the conditions for the creation of 
large-scale industries from the 1960s. The Nkrumah government's Second Development 
Plan of 1959 had sought to 'develop to the maximum' Ghana's ' potential for 
industrialisation' and the state took a direct role in establishing large-scale industries .54 
In its broad form, successive governments followed this paradigm of state-led 
industrialisation until the Structural Adjustment Programme of the mid 19808.55 
London, 1978). Jonathan H. Frimpong-Ansah, The Vampire State in Africa. The Political Economy of 
Decline in Ghana (James Cum:y: London, 1991). Rimmer, Staying Poor. 
SI World Bank, World Development Report, 1989 (World Bank: Washington, D.C., 1989), 218-21 , cited 
in Stewart et al., Alternative Development Strategies, table 2.1, 50. 
52 World Bank, World Development Report, 1989, 218-21, cited in Stewart et al., Alternative Development 
Strategies, table 2.1,50. 
S3 Caroline Gockah, 'ITI1J idea glitters in the Mombasa · sun"', in GRATIS, GRATIS News, 13 (1991), 
2. Sabina Anokye Mensah and Patrick Nirno, 'Rate of Exchange Rises for African Ideas', in GRATIS, 
GRATIS News, 10 (1990), 7. 
,. Ghana, Second Development Plan, 1959-64 (Government Printer: Accra, 1959), 3, 17-9. 
ss Killick, Development Economies, ch. 11. Rimmer, Staying Poor, chs 6-7. Frimpong-Ansah, Vampire 
State, 99 ff. 
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APPENDIX 1. THE GROWTH OF SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY, 1970-84. 
Figures for the growth of small-scale industry have been derived by subtracting the 
number engaged in industrial firms engaging 30 or more workers from Population 
Census figures which show the total number of workers by economic sector. 
For 1970: 
• Number of workers in industrial firms engaging 30 or more workers: 43,632. Source: 
Ghana, Industrial Statistics, 1970-72 (Accra: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1980), table 
5, 1l. 
• Number of workers engaged in the industrial sector: 380,415 . Source: 1970 
Population Census, cited in K. Ewusi, The Size of the Labour Force and Structure of 
Employment in Ghana (Legon: Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, 
1978), table 2.15, 84. 
= > Number of workers in small-scale industries: 336,783. 
For 1984: 
• Number of workers in industrial firms engaging 30 or more workers : 55,604. Source: 
Ghana, Industrial Statistics, 1982-84 (Acera: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1986), table 
3.26,62 . 
• Number of workers aged 15 or above engaged in the industrial sector: 588,418. 
Source: Ghana, 1984 Population Census of Ghana. Demographic and Economic 
Characteristics (Accra: Statistical Service, 1987), table 11, 57-65. 
= > Number of workers in small-scale industries: 532,814. 
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